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A

Military Diſſertation,

Containing a PLAN for

RECRUITING THE BRITISH ARMY,

AND

Improving its Eſtabliſhment.

DEDICATED BY PERMISSION TO

HIS MAJESTY.

TO WHICH IS ADDED A

SECOND PLAN,

FOR

Manning the Navy, by a Mode which will prove at once more effectual and more popular, than that hitherto purſued; and by which, the number of Seamen will be encreaſed to ſuch a degree, as will prevent a future Scarcity of them in all ſuch Emergencies, as the preſent.

ALSO

A THIRD PLAN,

For Recruiting the EAST INDIA COMPANY's Service, without having recourſe to the worſt of all meaſures, that of KID-NAPPING.

By COLONEL *STUART DOUGLAS.*

In rebus magnis, memoriæque dignis, conſilia primum, deinde acta, poſtea eventus, ſpectantur. CIC. de Orat.

LONDON:

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TO THE

KING.

SIR,

IN this great Conflict of Arms, no other mode preſents itſelf, whereby I can poſſibly give teſtimony, of my loyal duty to your Majeſty, and of my zealous regard for the general intereſts of my fellow ſubjects, than, by putting in order the following obſervations, which are the reſult of ſome ſtudy, and of ſeveral years experience; and which, by your Gracious Permiſſion, I have here the honour to inſcribe to your Majeſty.

Your Naval and Military Armaments, Sir, have long been ſubject to ſuch impediments, as have very much

retarded, and often prevented the due efficacy, of their moſt important operations. Nothing has ſo much contributed to a misfortune of this magnitude, as the invariable adherence to the preſent modes of levying men, for both ſervices; which ſeem to be continued, merely, from a reluctance, to make innovation on ancient cuſtom; though every one knows, thoſe cuſtoms took their riſe at periods, when national exigencies were as circumſcribed, as they are now immenſe and urgent.

In the following diſſertation, I ſhall endeavour to point out the defects of thoſe modes, and to ſuggeſt others; which, if my zeal for your Majeſty's ſervice, does not too far miſlead me, will not only prove more popular than thoſe hitherto purſued; but be found, even competent to the great and multiplied demands of this War, on which the Fate of Nations ſeems to depend.

On

On theſe principles, Sir, ſupported too, by thoſe of Liberty, and of Humanity, the ſubject of this ſmall Treatiſe is founded; to which, if it ſtrictly adheres, I know of no ſtronger recommendation it can have, to your Majeſty's Royal Mind.

Theſe pages lay no claim to that highly poliſhed ſtyle, which favourably prepoſſeſſes the judgment, and intereſts the paſſions, in behalf of ſubjects much leſs important, than thoſe it treats of. Its language, however, flows from a heart filled with zealous loyalty to your Majeſty, and with that regard to public welfare, which comprehends in its affections, the intereſts of ſociety in general.

But, the ſubject matter of it, I humbly flatter myſelf, is ſuch as may deſerve the conſideration of Government, at this juncture; and I further preſume to hope, however defectively it may be treated in the following

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ing ſheets, it will, at leaſt afford ſome hints, capable of improvement by abler hands.

That it may, in this light, prove agreeable to your Majeſty, merit the honour of ſome degree of your Royal Attention and Patronage, and be, at the ſame time, beneficial to a profeſſion, in which I have paſſed two-thirds of my life, are now the objects of my moſt anxious wiſh, as they were the original motives that prompted this firſt public Eſſay of an unſkilful pen, directed by a hand, heretofore accuſtomed to ſerve your Majeſty with other weapons.

I have the honour to be, with the moſt reſpectful Attachment,

SIR,

Your MAJESTY'S

moſt devoted faithful ſubject,

and obedient humble ſervant,

ST. DOUGLAS.

PREFACE.

THE characteriſtic genius of the Britiſh nation, is at once commercial and military, and it proves happily ſo, as arms and commerce generally afford reciprocal ſupport to each other. Nevertheleſs, commerce, in ſome inſtances, is prejudicial to arms, and checks their neceſſary progreſs.

By that immenſe influx of riches, which is neceſſarily derived from very extenſive trade, luxury becomes the natural offspring of wealth, which in its turn operates ſo as to enhance greatly the price of labor, and of all the neceſſaries of life. Theſe cauſes united form a natural chain of connection; and with an induſtrious, opulent people, prove an inſurmountable obſtacle to the recruiting ſervice of the army, on the uſual terms, and mode of beating up for volunteers; as neither the military pay, nor bounty money, bear any degree of proportion to thoſe advanced prices.

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The common people of theſe kingdoms, generally earn by their labor, from 15 pence, to half a crown per day; they are too knowing, when in their ſober ſenſes, to be induced to reſign theſe profits ariſing from induſtry, merely for the pleaſure, as they ſay, of wearing a red coat, and ſtanding to be ſhot at for 5d. per day; a trifle, they alledge, hardly ſufficient, to ſupply a man in health, with bread and ſmall beer only. It is unneceſſary to form any queſtion, whether this ſuppoſition is well founded, or not. Certain it is, that whilſt they entertain ſuch an idea, and reaſon in this manner, it puts an end to all hopes of ſucceſs in volunteer-recruiting on the uſual plan.

This being the caſe, it is evident to every man, that new arrangements muſt of neceſſity, be reſorted to, and in making them, great attention muſt be paid to the two following circumſtances: 1ſt. That the occaſional recruiting, or augmenting of theſe eſtabliſhments ſhould be performed with diſpatch and certainty, in order that the national ſervice may ſuffer no riſque of diſappointment; and,

2dly. That the meaſures employed, ſhould be ſuch as coincide with the leading principle, and national character of the people. If theſe things are not attended to, the levies will be apt to prove ſo precarious, or defective, that the moſt important deſigns of the ſervice, muſt be fruſtrated.

The victories formerly obtained over the French, by the great Duke of Marlborough, had ſo much diſtreſſed, and diſcouraged them, that volunteer-recruiting became impracticable: To remedy this evil, Louis the XIV. very judiciouſly iſſued an edict, obliging every pariſh, in proportion to their population, to ſupply its quota of recruits, to be regulated upon the general eſtimate, for the completion, or augmentation of his army.

The meaſure was then ſo effectual for his recruiting ſervice, and proved ſo agreeable to that people in general, becauſe it made them their own aſſeſſors, that this mode of levying men has been continued ever ſince, and is conſidered as the beſt, which that government could poſſibly adopt.

The French have greatly improved their navy, on the plan of our naval diſcipline, and

particularly, in fighting their ſhips after our manner. Waving therefore all narrow prejudices, let us by way of repriſal, imitate ſuch wiſe example, and inſtitute a plan of recruiting, in ſome degree ſimilar to theirs.

Fas eſt, et ab Hoſte doceri.

Every ſpecies of impreſs cannot but be repugnant to the national character and diſpoſition of a free born Briton, more eſpecially when enforced by the hand of government. But if a law be enacted, ſomewhat ſimilar to that above-mentioned, or ſuch, as ſhall be more fully deſcribed in the following treatiſe, by which the people may be empowered to aſſeſs themſelves, both ſervices may then be readily ſupplied with men; and the people will chooſe, without reluctance, thoſe who are fitteſt for the ſervice, and who can beſt be ſpared from labour, &c.

It may be urged that this is ſtill a ſpecies of impreſs; but to this we anſwer, that the people's ideas of it being intirely reverſed, by its becoming an act of their own, the meaſure will thereby be rendered ſo palatable, as to en-

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ſure ſucceſs; eſpecially, if ſome expedient be ſuggeſted at the ſame time, of making ſome ſmall addition to the military pay, ſo as to render it more proportionate to the preſent advanced prices of labour, and of all neceſſaries of life. And all this we hope can be done without encreaſing in any material degree, the burthen of the public revenue.

Such is the nature of the plan now offered to conſideration; and, if the writer, early impreſſed with the graver ideas of a more ſolemn profeſſion, for which his firſt education had intended him, ſhould be thought to have indulged himſelf too much in moral reflexions, while he was writing on military matters; he hopes, after having ſo long partaken of a more active profeſſion; allowances will be made for his recurring, at this period, to his firſt caſt of thought, more eſpecially, if thoſe reflections, are ſuch, as have naturally ariſen from the ſubject.

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PLAN

FOR

Augmenting and Recruiting the Britiſh *Army, and improving its Eſtabliſhment*, &c. &c. &c.

SECT. I.

TO adhere rigidly to ancient forms, without paying due attention to thoſe viciſſitudes, which the moſt important intereſts of ſtates, in proceſs of time, are liable to, would manifeſt as little genius for war, as for civil government.

The great and leading principles of the Britiſh Conſtitution, ſo juſtly admired by the moſt enlightened men of every nation for the wiſdom of its inſtitution, ought ever to be held ſacred and kept inviolate from every degree of variation, or encroachment.

Yet, as long cuſtom has given ſanction to

ſeveral public regulations, which, a few centuries ago, might have been wiſely enough adopted, according to the national circumſtances of theſe times, and agreeable to the general ſtate of the then prevailing intereſts of the neighbouring powers of Europe; but, which in the preſent important and moſt critical exigencies, are become inadequate to them, or rather moſt obviouſly tending to national ruin; to adhere to ſuch expedients, would undoubtedly be in the higheſt degree abſurd, and impolitical.

Of thoſe ancient cuſtoms, which are become ſo inadequate to the purpoſes and augmented demands of national ſervice, there are none that ſo much demand the ſerious attention of government, and call ſo loudly for alteration, as the preſent incompetent and pernicious meaſures purſued in recruiting and augmenting the army, and in ſupplying the navy with ſeamen; ſince thoſe meaſures have hitherto proved inſurmountable impediments to our ſucceſs in this extenſive and moſt expenſive war. This is a fact too ſenſibly felt to be denied; nor can we, with any degree of probability, hope for better fortune, unleſs ſome ample means

means of augmenting and recruiting both our naval and military eſtabliſhments be adopted, which may enable us to change the nature of this defenſive war, into the moſt active and vigorouſly offenſive operations.

As theſe old inſufficient regulations, which long ago ſhould have been relinquiſhed, have no connection with the great outlines of the Britiſh Conſtitution, but are rather unneceſſary encroachments on it, the alteration of them can be made with more eaſe and propriety, in order to ſubſtitute others better calculated to ſupply the great exigencies of the preſent, or of any future war, however general.

The Roman policy in this reſpect is highly worthy of our imitation: ſo far from obſtinately purſuing their own original military ſyſtem, they allowed experience to teach them wiſdom; even from thoſe enemies whom they deemed barbarous, they were not aſhamed to learn whatever tended to improve their military eſtabliſhment, and art of war; ſo that they never adhered rigidly, as other nations do, to the cuſtoms and military regulations of their anceſtors,

but, wiſely, ſelected the moſt approved practices of the enemy, or by invention, varied their own, according to the degree of reſiſtance they met with. By this judicious conduct, in proceſs of time, they attained to ſuch an aſtoniſhing ſeries of conqueſts, as, at laſt, rendered Rome the miſtreſs of the world. An illuſtrious example to all nations in ſucceeding times, who aſpire to ſuch eminence in military fame.

We have already had experience ſufficient to prove, that the ordinary methods uſed in raiſing men for land and ſea ſervice, by beating up for volunteers, and impreſſing ſeamen, have generally been expenſive and oppreſſive, often, ſo tedious and incompetent to the purpoſe, as to retard, and thereby occaſion a total diſappointment of the moſt critical and important undertakings. The preſent imcompleat ſtate of the old regiments, and the tedious, almoſt inſurmountable difficulties that occur in manning the Navy, are ſtubborn proofs in point.

The ſucceſs of offenſive operations in war, depends chiefly on the expedition, vigour, and ſecrecy of the meaſures neceſſary to the execution thereof. They have ever been

juſtly

juſtly deemed more powerful and effectual than defenſive operations; the ſooner, therefore, a defenſive war can be converted into an offenſive one, the more readily its ſucceſs will be aſcertained. But all attempts to this important end muſt prove abortive, unleſs the moſt judicious regulations be previouſly eſtabliſhed by law, for procuring the moſt ſpeedy and effectual ſupplies of men, in order to recruit, or occaſionally augment the eſtabliſhment of both the naval and military ſervice.

It ſeems indiſputably neceſſary, that Great Britain, now involved in an extenſive war with France, Spain, and America *, and not improbably, threatened with hoſtilities from other quarters, call forth and exert her whole force in the moſt ſpirited manner, both by ſea and land, as being the only effectual means of confounding her avowed enemies, of awing ſuch as are inclined to commence hoſtilities, and of confirming others who may be wavering in the

* This obſervation which was written ſome months ago, ſeems confirmed by the war which we are engaged in with Holland.

faith, which they owe to their ancient, and moſt ſolemn engagements.

On this principle, let us ſuppoſe it is finally reſolved upon, to carry on the war offenſively, with all poſſible exertions, againſt the combined powers of France, Spain, and America. Arduous indeed is the attempt, but its ſucceſs moſt practicable; provided we abandon the narrow-beaten tracks of ſupplying the army with men, by beating up for volunteers, almoſt ineffectually, and the navy with ſeamen, by the odious means of impreſs.—Change theſe injudicious meaſures, and the pride of the turbulent Houſe of Bourbon may be humbled once more to the duſt; the unnatural American rebellion will be cruſhed, and the viſionary independence which prompted it, will vaniſh, like the baſeleſs fabrick of a dream.

To carry on an offenſive war ſucceſsfully, much more extenſive armaments are neceſſary, than when a defenſive one is maintained. But the many advantages that accrue from the former, are an abundant compenſation for the neceſſary expenditures that attend it. It procures, among ſeveral other advantages, a fair chance of ending the

ſtruggle,

ſtruggle, by one active, deciſive campaign; but feeble muſt the aſſailant nation be, weak muſt be her exertions, if ſhe be repulſed at once, ſo as not to return to the aſſault with redoubled ſpirit, and at length conquer ſome part of a widely diffuſed empire, acting every where on the defenſive.

In a country where faction is carried to ſuch a pitch of violence, as to abſorb every paſſion and public principle for its own ſupport, it behoves the wiſdom and policy of thoſe, who hold the reins of government, to inquire into the temper, principles, zeal, and abilities of ſuch officers of rank, as may be truſted with ſupreme command. It is therefore incumbent on Miniſters previouſly to make them the aſſociates of their convivial and leiſure hours; elſe, how can they, with preciſion, form any proper judgment of the men they mean to employ in the important truſt?

When they have made a trial of the diſpoſition and capacity of the officers, by placing them either ſubordinately, or in ſome degree of chief command, and find them fully anſwer their own, and the public expectation,—then is the ſeaſon to ſtrengthen

their hands, and enlarge their authority. Without this eſſential precaution, the riſque of ſuch a truſt is too great, when ſo much is at ſtake; *when* there is queſtion of nothing leſs, than maintaining the ſplendour and proſperity of a great people, or perhaps preſerving their very exiſtence as a nation.

On a fair inveſtigation, it muſt appear to every intelligent man, and indeed to the nation at large, that in the proſecution of the moſt extenſive plan of ſpirited efforts, under the direction of officers, whoſe abilities have been thus put to the teſt, it is more profitable to the ſtate, to expend thirty millions on one active, vigorous campaign, than to employ only twenty millions, yearly, on two undeciſive languid ones, giving thereby to all thoſe powers of Europe, who are in any degree our rivals, an opportunity of forming leagues againſt us.

The chance of ſucceſs in purſuing ſuch a plan of war, would juſtify the experiment, and would, in the end, prove the moſt œconomical ſyſtem, as well as the moſt effectual; but ſhould it not, œconomy is only a ſecondary conſideration, ſince the *Salus populi* is the principal

principal object, which government obviouſly has in view.

Having ſo far premiſed theſe conſiderations, we ſhall now proceed to the firſt article of the propoſed plan, *viz.* To ſuggeſt the more ready and ample means of augmenting the Army, in time of war, and of ſupplying it on all occaſions, with much better recruits, than by beating up for volunteers, with precarious ſucceſs, and promiſcuouſly inliſting the tradeſman, the manufacturer, the huſband, the father, the profligate, *&c.* under all the aggravating circumſtances of grievous circumvention to individuals, of injury to arts and manufactures, and the moſt flagrant violation of the intereſts of the community in general.

1ſt. To avoid theſe evils, and procure thoſe advantages, let Parliament enact a law, obliging the Lord Lieutenant, the Sheriff, and Grand Jury of each county of Great Britain, and Ireland, to order every year, or oftner, an exact return to be made out, of all the men in each pariſh of their reſpective counties, fit to bear arms, from 16 to 26 years of age; and another of all the men from 26 years of age to 36; particularly

ſpecifying

ſpecifying how many of each claſs, are tradeſmen and manufacturers; how many are married men with families of children; and how many are ſingle men without trades; which returns, when exactly made out, are to be ſent to the Secretary at War.

2dly. Theſe returns, when obtained, are to be inſpected by the Commander in Chief, and by him, or the Secretary at War, laid before the King in Council, that, when the number of men neceſſary for the ſervice of the year is aſcertained, either for augmenting the army, or recruiting the old corps, the counties may then be aſſeſſed, to ſupply, at a certain period, their reſpective quotas of recruits, proportionably to their ſeveral returns, and to the claſs of ages and occupations, which his Majeſty in Council may require to be draughted.

3dly. When this aſſeſsment of the ſeveral counties is made, a copy of each county aſſeſsment is to be tranſmitted to their reſpective Lord Lieutenants, and by them communicated to the Sheriffs and Grand Juries, who muſt be required to make the diſtribution of the county aſſeſsment

ment to the ſeveral pariſhes, in proportion to the number of men contained in the reſpective pariſh returns, fit to bear arms, and agreeably to the claſs of ages and occupations ordered to be draughted.

For inſtance, if on inſpecting the general returns from each nation, it be found, that the younger claſs of men from 16 to 26 years of age, who have not been bred to trades or manufactures, and are neither huſbands nor fathers, contains double or treble the number of men, neceſſary for the ſervice of the year; it is preſumed, that it will be agreeable to the wiſdom of government, to take the whole number of the general aſſeſsment from this claſs of young men, as being the fitteſt to be ſpared from the purpoſes of trade and population, and beſt adapted to the military ſervice of their country.

Should there not be found recruits enough of this deſcription in the junior claſs of ſubjects, recourſe muſt be had to the bachelors of the ſenior claſs, without trades; and if ſtill a greater number be requiſite for the public ſervice, they muſt be taken from the married

married men of the junior claſs, without trades, obliging the ſeveral pariſhes to give a certain weekly allowance to the wives and children of thoſe men thus employed in the ſervice of their country; and to aſſign them ſome ſuitable occupation, ſufficient to maintain them, until the huſband and father return. By thus ſupplying the army with men, who can be beſt ſpared from national induſtry; arts, commerce, and population will ſtill continue to flouriſh more in a war ſo conducted, than they have hitherto done in peace; and as theſe are the great ſources of wealth, by a ſtrict attention to preſerve and cultivate them, the ſinews of war will be more eaſily ſupplied, and better afforded by all ranks of ſubjects.

4thly. Should the exigencies of war ſtill require further ſupplies of men, let recourſe be had to the other diviſions of the two claſſes. This will always be a ſure reſource, if a ſufficient number is not to be got of the firſt and ſecond deſcription; which is a ſuppoſition merely poſſible, in three great kingdoms, inhabited by near ten millions of ſubjects, of courageous ſpirit.

5thly. About

5thly. About ſix weeks, previous to calling forth the aſſeſſed men, let the Lord Lieutenants order advertiſements to be publiſhed in every pariſh of their reſpective counties, inviting young men without trades, who are of good ſize, and free from perſonal defects, and offering them, from two to four guineas bounty money, to inliſt as volunteers, previous to the aſſeſsment of the pariſh; they are to be directed to go with a Conſtable, or Church-warden, to the neareſt Juſtice of Peace, to be atteſted; they are to receive one half of the bounty money, when approved on the field in the county, appointed for the place of rendezvous; the other half, when they join their regiment. The Juſtice of Peace muſt ſend every Saturday to the Sheriff's clerk, the certificates of all the volunteers who have enliſted from week to week. Thoſe certificates muſt contain the name of the recruit, the bounty money promiſed, and an exact deſcription of his ſize, age and perſon; and it will moreover be requiſite, that all this be engroſſed weekly in one general return, and laid before the Sheriff, and by him before the Lord Lieutenant, as alſo

before

before the Grand Jury, when they meet to aſſeſs the pariſhes, in the number wanted to compleat their county quotas of recruits.

Should Parliament enact a law to this effect, there is no doubt, that in a ſhort time, this bounty money would induce a ſufficient number of men, to offer themſelves volunteers, rather than riſque being aſſeſſed without bounty; though, indeed, the counties ought to be at the expence of beſtowing a ſmall bounty, even on the aſſeſſed men. This ought not, however, to exceed half a guinea, in order to make the diſtinction the greater, between volunteers and aſſeſsed men.

6thly. To the preſent numerical deſignation of each regiment, let there be added local ones; and order each corps to receive recruits from that county or city, of which they reſpectively bear the name; this will induce young fellows more readily to turn out volunteers, to ſerve in their county regiment, wherever they may have brothers, couſins, or pariſh acquaintances.

The benefit ariſing from this regulation is obvious. It will create what the French call *L'eſprit de corps*, which they ſo carefully

cheriſh and entertain; being ſenſible that it ſtimulates men to the moſt gallant actions, and to the moſt regular courſe of good behaviour, at all times. Their companions, influenced by this ſpirit, become their monitors; they boaſt of their good conduct, as ſoldiers, when they return home diſcharged; if it is doubted, they appeal to the companions of their ſervice; they recite their own tranſactions, and the hiſtory of their corps, in good fellowſhip, over a pot of ale. This excites, in the young liſtening generation, both pleaſure and aſtoniſhment, and kindles in their breaſts a longing deſire of diſtinguiſhing themſelves by ſimilar adventures.—Judicious officers might ſo direct and cultivate this diſpoſition in their ſoldiers, as to make it a ruling principle, of more force than the ſevereſt pains and penalties of articles of war, and, thereby, lead them to as glorious atchievements, as diſtinguiſhed our brave anceſtors, in the fields of Creſſi, Agincourt, *&c.*

7th. Here let the practice end, which is ſo unworthy of Britons to exact, or perform, *viz.* that of military ſervice for life. Human

man invention could not poſſibly have contrived a more effectual obſtacle to volunteer recruiting than this, which the abſurdity of cuſtom has eſtabliſhed, and, too long continued, in an age more enlightened than that which gave birth to its inſtitution.

Servitude for life, attended with all the rigour of military diſcipline, with ſuch ſcanty ſubſiſtence, as five-pence a day pay can afford, for the neceſſaries of food, and ſmall cloathing, moſt certainly conſtitutes the compleateſt idea of ſlavery, that can poſſibly exiſt under the moſt deſpotic form of government; it is the ſource of deſertion, of theft, of robbery, *&c.* and of the puniſhments incurred by ſuch capital crimes.

On inſtituting an eſtabliſhment for national ſervice, the genius and temper of the people, is the firſt object to be attended to; and its regulations are to be adapted accordingly. They ſhould be founded on the baſis of reaſon and ſound policy; not on the abſurdity of ancient cuſtom.

Surely, no inſtitution could poſſibly be invented more heterogeneous to the changeable fickle temper, and high ſpirit of a people, naturally

naturally fond of their liberty, which they deem to be their birth-right, than ſuch a ſpecies of military ſervice; whilſt it invites men to inliſt, ſuch as are capable of any degree of reaſon, are rebuted by the diſguſting proſpect, which the real circumſtances of the ſervice afford. For, the number of recruits now obtained, is more owing to the phrenzy of drunkenneſs, and to the impoſitions of recruiting parties, than to the ſober choice and inclination of the men inliſted; daily repentance is the natural conſequence of the unneceſſary deception, and hence, too, are derived the numberleſs evils we have already alluded to.

What other reaſons can be aſſigned for the regular, decent deportment of the militia, who ſeldom commit thoſe offences which ſubject them to corporal and capital puniſhments? In their ſober ſenſes, the law of their country ſends them forth, to ſerve for a limited time; they know the terms of their ſervice are far from being ſo eligible, as what they may acquire by their labour; but they meet with nothing in it contrary to their expectations. Hence they march on chearfully,

and thank God, they are not engaged to ſerve for life, on the ſpare diet that fivepence a day can afford.

This is an inconteſtable proof in point, of the many advantages, that ariſe from limiting military ſervice, to a certain period of years; a more reputable claſs of men will be, thereby, induced to ſerve *men* whoſe minds are naturally inclined to the privilege of changing, which the conſtitutional government of their country admits of; but revolts at the very idea of engaging in any ſervitude for life.

For theſe reaſons, which, it muſt be acknowledged, appear of greater weight, than any that can be adduced in ſupport of perpetual ſervitude, let all recruits from the age of 16 to 21, be inliſted for the ſpace of five years only; thoſe from 21 to 26, to ſerve for four years only, and thoſe from 26 to 36, to ſerve for three years only; giving all the ſoldiers of the army, who are now engaged for life, the moſt poſitive aſſurance, that when the war ends, they ſhall have the option, of being gradually diſcharged, according to the ſeniority of their ſervice. Let this be, at the rate of 60, 80, or 100 men per regiment

regiment annually, until the whole be diſcharged.—Never was any nation, ſerved by ſoldiers, of more diſtinguiſhed bravery, than thoſe the preſent Britiſh army conſiſts of.

For, every man, whoſe heart glows in liberal approbation of the native diſtinguiſhed courage of his countrymen, muſt acknowledge, that the want of greater ſucceſs in this war, is not owing to any deficiency in the Britiſh common ſoldiers, nor the ſubordinate officers of any rank whatever.

Hence, to give them ſuch an *option*, will appear a juſt tribute of acknowledgement, from a wiſe, and indulgent government, to their great military merit; and will ſerve as an incitement to ſtill braver conduct, if poſſible.

This ſyſtem will be productive of another conſiderable advantage, *viz.* that of ſaving expences. Part of the public revenue will be no more employed in maintaining ſuperannuated ſoldiers, on the out-penſion liſt; for, by this arrangement, there will be none; ſo that Chelſea College alone, will be nearly, if not fully ſufficient, to contain all the maimed within its walls; provided the directors of this eſtabliſhment

adopt it, as an invariable rule, to admit no man, who has not loſt a limb, or is not otherwiſe diſabled by ſervice, from gaining a livelihood.

8thly. To ſupply the expence of bounty money, to volunteers, and aſſeſſed men, in the preſent incumbered ſtate of the public revenue; let the non-effective funds of each regiment be ſtrictly accounted for by the ſeveral agents, and by them paid into the hands of a Receiver-general, appointed for the purpoſe. The deficiency of bounty money, in caſe there be any, after the collection of the non-effective funds, and calculation of the rates already ſpecified, according to the number of recruits to be raiſed for the ſervice of the year, muſt be ſupplied by an aid from Parliament, agreeable to an annual eſtimate. It ſeems neceſſary, that Parliament ſhould grant the ſame aid in the preſent caſe of recruiting the army, as is granted for manning the navy. An equal neceſſity urges on both ſides; but with this œconomical difference, that the ſum given to volunteers, ſhall not exceed from two, to four guineas a man, to which

expence

expence the general non-effective funds of the army ſhall be applied in part; however, this, may ſometimes prove ſufficient, ſometimes deficient.

It is neceſſary to obſerve here, that if the inliſting of recruits for a limited term of years take place, (unleſs they be raiſed by provincial, or parochial aſſeſſment) the expence of bounty money will become arbitrary and enormous; as men may not chooſe to enliſt, even for a few years, unleſs a much larger ſum be given in bounty money;—but the pariſhes being the beſt judges of the men who can be moſt conveniently ſpared from labour and manufactures, are to ſend a liſt of thoſe men, choſen for the military ſervice, to the Sheriff, and Grand Jury, who muſt order them to repair to the place of rendezvous, on a certain day appointed, where volunteers will receive a part of the bounty money promiſed.

9thly. To the end, that the navy may be ſupplied with ſuch men as are fitteſt for its moſt important ſervice, let it be ordered by act of Parliament, that all ſea-port towns, fiſhing villages, and pariſhes, immediately

on the coaſts of Great Britain, and Ireland, ſhall furniſh their quotas, intirely of ſuch men, as have been accuſtomed to ſome degree of ſea-faring life. But this ſubject muſt be reſerved for the laſt ſection, wherein it ſhall be further enlarged on.

To this ſection, ſuffice it to add for the preſent, that if this provincial mode of ſupplying the navy, and military ſervice with men, be approved of, and adopted, this momentuous advantage, will be thereby obtained, that both army and navy will be readily ſupplied with able men at once, and in due ſeaſon, for action, ſo as to have the ſtart of the enemy on all emergent occaſions: an *advantage*, which we are now precluded from, by the dilatory mode of raiſing men for the navy and army, by beating up for volunteers, and impreſſing ſeamen; whereby the hands of government are fettered; the ſucceſs of their plans, which intirely depended on the promptitude of execution, is totally fruſtrated, after great expence; and the nation in general diſappointed. The ſyſtem here propoſed, obviates all thoſe inconveniencies, and removes all obſtacles to ſuch ſpeedy

levies

levies of men, as would give us irreſiſtible ſuperiority over the numerous forces of the houſe of Bourbon, ſo formidabe in its preſent ambitious confederacy.

By ſhortening the term of military ſervice, a young fellow inliſted at 16 or 18 years of age, after having ſerved five years, receives his diſcharge, and returns home in the full vigour of life, fit to commence any labour, to apply himſelf to any trade, and to fulfill, a ſtill more important duty to the ſtate,—that of giving life to a new race of ſubjects, by wedlock; to which, he ought to be invited by ſome privilege held out by the Legiſlature, to ſerve both as a reward for his military ſervice, and an inducement to obey the firſt great law of nature *.

But,

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* As it may require ſome time to ſettle the arrangements here pointed out; in order to obtain a ſupply of men for recruiting the corps intended for immediate ſervice, let permiſſion be given to officers who are now recruiting, to inliſt all ſuch men as may offer themſelves volunteers from the militia, to ſerve in the army, for three years, or during the war, and let them allow the militia regiments, 5l. for every man ſo inliſted,

But after all the arguments that can be adduced in ſupport of our plan, the influence of its moſt obſtinate enemy, is to be dreaded, as too powerful an opponent to its eſtabliſhment. Ancient cuſtom bears ſo deſpotic a ſway in this country, that it becomes a ſort of treaſon to diſpute her authority. In ſpite

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which ſum they are to apply to inliſting other militia men, to ſupply the vacancies ſo made.

As an inducement to militia men to inliſt, on this occaſion, in the army, let ſome privilege be offered them too, ſuch as exempting them from pariſh duties for ten years, or for life, providing they inliſt and ſerve on theſe terms.

By theſe means ſeveral thouſands of well-diſciplined good men, may immediately be obtained, to compleat the old corps, or perhaps to raiſe ſome new ones.

But this is ſuggeſted only as a temporary expedient, as it might appear an encroachment on the original inſtitution of the militia. In this caſe however, the plea of neceſſity, might for once juſtify the expedient in the opinion of all reaſonable men; providing this ſingle inſtance be not drawn into precedent on future occaſions, which in the end might create diſcontents, and prove pernicious to the community in general, by decreaſing the ſtatute labour, and other parochial duties, as now eſtabliſhed by law, for very wiſe purpoſes.

of

of the native good ſenſe of the people, ſhe holds their reaſon in chains. She is the only tyrant that dares, with impunity, invade the liberty of the ſubject, as, for inſtance, in the practice of impreſs; whereby ſhe raiſes herſelf, even above the laws of the country. Theſe are ſubject to alteration and repeal; nay, lawyers, by their ſophiſtry, can elude and totally counteract, their efficacy; but none dare attempt to reprobate and ſupercede the general received authority of eſtabliſhed *cuſtom*.

In this reſpect, how different is our practice from that of the wiſeſt and moſt warlike of ancient nations! The Romans, were of all people, the readieſt, to abandon their own cuſtoms for better; if they approved of the tactics of their enemies, they immediately adopted them; they choſe to uſe the Grecian arms for their cavalry, and laid aſide the Roman. In ſhort, as their conqueſts rolled on, they always gleaned ſomething uſeful from every nation they ſubjugated. This perpetual attention to the improvement of diſcipline, and military eſtabliſhment,

bliſhment, at laſt entitled them of neceſſity to the empire of the univerſe.

The following obſervation of one of the moſt illuſtrious authors of that wiſe and great nation, is proof in point of this aſſertion; with the quotation of it, this long ſection ſhall be concluded.

Honeſtiſſimum enim eſt, Majorum veſtigia
Sequi, ſi modo, recte itinere, preceſſerunt.

PLIN. Lib. v.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Containing ſome uſeful Maxims, and Examples of Diſcipline, taken chiefly from Authors on this Subject.

MILITARY diſcipline, properly conſiſts in maintaining order and good policy, without which the fineſt armies would ſoon become bands of robbers, and aſſaſſins.

It comprehends a ſtrict regularity of manners to be obſerved by all thoſe, who embrace the profeſſion of arms; a perfect obedience of the inferior officer to the ſuperior, in all the different gradations of rank; and it amply authoriſes the cenſure, or exemplary puniſhment of thoſe, who are found culpable.

Young people, on coming into the army, are often under a deluſion as pernicious as it is groundleſs. They are apt to imagine military men have a right to be licentious, and may with impunity violate the laws of religion, and of civil ſociety. Yet *true* honour reſults from the conſtant practice of virtuous, and worthy actions. Irreligion degrades man below

below the irrational brute; vice ſtains his mind, taints his perſon with diſeaſe, and degrades his reputation. If body and mind are, thus, deprived of their natural vigour, where ſhall we find the brave and robuſt ſoldier, or the great captain?

To conſtitute the character of a good ſoldier, he muſt neceſſarily be brave, with that manly firmneſs of mind which is remote from obſtinacy and pride; he muſt have leſs weakneſs, and more courage than is neceſſary for other men; he ought to be cool, and poſſeſs himſelf at all times, but more particularly when in action; he muſt not fear death, and muſt therefore be of exemplary virtue, and good conduct; with all theſe qualities, he muſt be juſt, humane, affable, and charitable in the ſtricteſt ſenſe and acceptation of the word; in ſhort, he muſt be *Integer vitæ, ſcelerumque purus*;—for, ſuch was the great Turenne, in one inſtance only, did the luſtre of his virtues ſuffer a conſiderable eclipſe, when by the ſanguinary mandate of his ſovereign, (a mandate that would have diſgraced a prince, in the moſt uncivilized ages) he tainted the almoſt unrivalled greatneſs of his mind, by making ſuch a horrid

horrid deſart of the Palatinate, as rendered that beautiful country, in a few hours, an univerſal ſcene of famine, and devaſtation. Such alſo was our own Edward, Prince of Wales, commonly called the Black Prince, a hero of untainted virtue, and of ſtill more glorious memory.

Young officers are too apt to affect a nice, and ſtudied taſte in dreſs, which is unſuitable to the military character, and of pernicious example; neatneſs, and decency, are moſt adapted to, and beſt becoming the profeſſion. —Among the Greeks, it was obſerved, that the good mein of the Macedonians, was brightened by the luſtre of their arms.

Almoſt all the German princes very wiſely oblige their officers, without diſtinction, to wear their uniform on all occaſions. By this regulation, the pernicious effects of luxury are prevented, the officers kept in the happy neceſſity of avoiding conſiderable expences, and their profeſſion raiſed to a degree of conſideration and reſpect. 'Tis for the ſame end they have inſtituted ſome military orders at their reſpective courts, whereby officers, in every rank, of ſeniority in ſervice, or of great merit, are ſtill further diſtinguiſhed.

Nothing

Nothing could be more plain, nothing could be more ſimple than the apparel, train, and equipages of Marſhal de Turenne. The moſt exact ſobriety was conſtantly obſerved at his table; no other wines, but thoſe produced by the country that he paſſed through, were drank at it; the duke of Loraine, the mareſchal de Catinat, and other great men, lived in the ſame ſtyle. Their great active minds were intent on purſuits of much more importance, than thoſe of ſumptuous repaſts, rich wines, and brilliant equipages.

The late Prince of Orange acted very properly, in prohibiting, by an expreſs ordinance, the Dutch generals, from having at their tables any other than plain meats. He even regulated the form and number of diſhes for each rank, when in the field. This regulation was ſo much approved by the late French king, that he made the like ordinance for his army.

The authority neceſſary to a general commanding an army, is ſuch, that he need only ſpeak to be obeyed. This authority communicates itſelf by gradation, to the moſt inferior officer, who holds any ſort of command, and

and, as it were by reflexion, thus becomes the firmeſt ſupport of the general's power, who ought to be chearfully, and implicitly obeyed by all. Implicitly, however, only ſo far, as it appears to a degree of evidence, to the officer commanded, that nothing contrary to the ſervice of his ſovereign, and country, or to his duty, as a man of honor, is required of him.

In either of theſe caſes, he ought to reſign the ſervice, or even decline to obey, rather than be the inſtrument of perpetrating a crime, which the laws of war, do not give ſanction to. But inſtances of ſuch treacherous abuſe of authority, are almoſt without example; in dubious caſes, therefore, it is beſt to obey.

It admits, however, of queſtion, whether Monſieur de Turenne would not appear greater, had he firmly remonſtrated againſt the above order of Lewis XIV. and offered to reſign the command, in caſe the ſaid order was not revoked.—It is true the diſcipline of the Romans was ſuch, that they muſt have obeyed, or ſuffer puniſhment; but in modern ages, princes, and their generals, find it pro-

per

per to relax the ſeverity, particularly in favor of a fortunate action.

The battle which prince Eugene fought near Zenta, was judged raſh; he had received orders not to fight; but finding circumſtances favorable, he thought he would be more reſponſible, if he loſt the faireſt opportunity of attacking the enemy with ſucceſs, than if he diſobeyed. He engaged, and gained a compleat victory over the Turks.-----Caprara, jealous of his glory, accuſed him of raſhneſs and diſobedience, and inſiſted on having the Prince brought to trial; but Leopold replied, it would be ungrateful to God, to puniſh the inſtrument he had made uſe of, to gain him that victory over his enemies. Hiſtory affords other inſtances of this nature, too tedious here to recite. Let this one ſuffice, as an example of a fortunate diſobedience, which ought never to be riſqued, but by a great officer; if unfortunate, it were happy for him to fall in the battle he has drawn on by his diſobedience.

To be expoſed to the fire of the enemy, without daring to attack, is a ſituation, of all others, the moſt trying to human nature, which

which revolts at ſuch inaction; but in war, we are not to chooſe our poſt; every man muſt obey the order he receives.

In a ſiege, thoſe who are commanded to cover the men at work in the lines of approach, have the embouchures of the cannon near, and in conſtant view, which are ready to ſend inſtant death among the covering party, and the work-men; others hear a hollow murmuring beneath their feet, which announces the preparation of the mine.---It may ſpring as quick as light, and reduce them to atoms in the air, or bury them alive by hundreds within the bowels of the earth. But on all theſe critical occaſions, duty requires ſtrict obedience; we muſt keep the poſt which fortune has allotted to us, yielding, as it behoves us, a firm belief to that ſound maxim of philoſophy, that partial evil is univerſal good. It was this principle, without doubt, inſpired the noble enthuſiaſm of Decius, when he devoted himſelf to the ſafety of his country. It was this which animated the Horatii and Curiatii in the glorious ſtrife, wherein the *amor patriæ* proved ſo ſuperior to all the tender ties, of both love and friendſhip; and, every good officer, under the

above circumſtances, muſt partake ſo much of the powerful influence of the principle, as to enable them, not only to elevate their own minds to ſome degree of the like enthuſiaſm, but they muſt alſo try to inſpire their ſoldiers with ſome ſhare of the ſame paſſion.

In countries where armies encamp, or are quartered, nothing is more neceſſary than the ſtricteſt obſervance of an exact diſcipline. Without it, the troops cannot be readily ſupplied. Beſides, war being, in itſelf, a great evil, or according to the French expreſſion, *la guerre eſtun fléau*, we are bound to moderate its diſmal effects, as far as in us lies. No criminals are more worthy of puniſhment, than thoſe who dare licentiouſly to maltreat the poor peaſants, and rob them of the little, that the general calamity of their country had left them.

The diſcipline of the Turks in the field, is held in great repute. In their camps, reigns the greateſt order and tranquillity; no exceſs, no ravage, no rapine there; ſo that the peaſants being ſecure from injury, chearfully carry their fruits and proviſions to camp, as to a regular market; they receive their prices, and return home in ſafety. By this good order,

abun-

abundance generally prevails in the Turkiſh camps. They are perfectly ſober in their manner of living. Content to drink water, and eat rice and mutton once a day, they often ſuffer themſelves to be cut in pieces on their poſt, rather than ſurrender it.

Voltaire greatly extolls the good diſcipline of the Swediſh troops, under Charles XII. "Their ſtrict diſcipline, he ſays, greatly "contributed to their victories. A ſoldier "durſt not refuſe to pay for what he bought, "nor go out of camp to ſeek for neceſſaries; "after a victory, they durſt not ſtrip the "dead without permiſſion. The king was "ſtrictly attentive, that all his orders were "exactly obeyed; prayers were ſaid regularly "twice a day in his camp; and he, to give "them an example of piety, as well as of valour, "was never abſent. The police of his camp "was much better than that of Copenhagen, "which he beſieged: and the peaſants choſe "rather to ſell their proviſions to the Swedes, "their enemies, than to the Danes, who did "not pay them ſo juſtly. The Swedes ſtill "boaſt of the good diſcipline they preſerved "in Saxony. It is true the contributions "raiſed there were great, but the Saxons

" were protected from all licentious inſult " from the S ediſh army."

If the commanding officers of regiments would only oblige the inferior officers to be very attentive to the regular conduct of the ſoldiers, and make them often call the rolls, both day and night; good order and diſcipline would then be very well preſerved, and it would be almoſt as eaſy to reſtrain a great army from licentiouſneſs, as it would be to regulate a ſingle batallion.

SECT. III.

On Military Puniſhments.

IN the diſtribution of puniſhments, great attention ſhould be paid, that they be proportioned to the nature of the crime they are meant to correct. Humanity requires, that they exceed not the degree of offence, whilſt good policy on the other hand, demands juſtice on the guilty, ſo that vice may be ſufficiently reſtrained by due penalties.

Nevertheleſs,

Nevertheleſs, the characteriſtic of a nation ought to be attentively conſidered, as the true barometer, by which penal laws ſhould be regulated, that the nature and mode of puniſhment may be properly adapted thereto, and exactly weighed in counterpoiſe to the criminality of the offence.

We look with horror on the unjuſt rigor of the Turkiſh government, which, without fair trial, moſt unmercifully orders the baſhaw, or general, who has loſt a battle, or the governor, who has been obliged to ſurrender his garriſon, to be ſtrangled; merely on a ſuſpicion, or ſurmiſe, that he has not done his duty. How different is the mild adminiſtration of Britiſh government?

We have of late ſeen both naval, and military commanders, return home, who, it is alledged, have either from ignorance, or factious diſaffection to the ſervice, failed in the important object of their command, and thus proved the means of protracting rebellion, and of involving their country, at length, in three foreign wars; without a proper profeſſional enquiry being made, in behalf of the injured Sovereign, and Nation, or, for theſe

officers, due exculpation, if blameleſs. How far this toleration is conſiſtent with ſound policy, or is neceſſary to make the wheels of government move more ſmoothly on, at preſent, we leave to better judges to determine.

But, the ſeditious voice of party, ought not to be received by reaſonable men, ſo implicitly, as to injure miniſters in the confidence, and good opinion of the nation; in times of danger, nothing can be more pernicious to public ſervice. Nor, will a juſt and liberal mind, on the other hand, allow the whiſpers of malevolence, to give it ſuch impreſſions, as tend to injure officers in their moſt important, and niceſt concerns,—namely, their reputation, and preferment, merely on ſurmiſe.—If there appear grounds of ſuſpicion, give a fair hearing to the one, and trial to the other, and let both ſtand, or fall, by legal ſentence of condemnation, or acquittal. *Audi alteram partem*, is the great and fundamental principle, of both law and equity.

The policy of France ſeems to keep a medium betwixt theſe two extremes. A French officer who, on trial, is found to have been deficient in his duty, is ſtript of all offices, and

and acquired dignities, and degraded from the rank, and privileges of a gentleman. This ſort of civil death, makes a greater impreſſion than a violent one, on the minds of a people, who hold honor, and diſtinction of rank, in the higheſt veneration.

A Muſcovite ſoldier, whoſe ſoul is benumbed by the rigor of his climate, and government, requires to be reſtrained by more ſevere puniſhments, than are neceſſary to correct the Britiſh ſoldier, whoſe mind is full of that civil liberty he was bred up with; impriſonment, diſgrace, or even cenſure, and reproof, will therefore operate often as forcibly againſt his committing offence, as the knaut, or a more ſevere puniſhment will, on the more torpid Ruſſian.

The Dutch have very judiciouſly corrected ſome ſeverities in their diſcipline; they put none to death, but thoſe who are guilty of murder, or robbery, are concerned in mutiny, or deſert in preſence of the enemy. In all other inſtances of deſertion, they are condemned to the chains of the wheel barrows, employed on public works: the engineers are to obſerve the behaviour of the ſeveral criminals;

nals; when real ſigns of repentance, and reformation appear, they report them accordingly to the Stadholder, who mitigates their ſentence, from labour for life, to a certain number of years; and as for thoſe who have been condemned to work for a time, the term of their puniſhment is ſhortened.

At the expiration of this period, the deſerter, in token of reformation, and pardon, is again received into the ranks, after a proper ceremony of waving the colours over his head, whilſt he kneels in preſence of the whole regiment, drawn up in arms: and if any ſoldier, afterwards, upbraids him with his crime, he is condemned to fulfill a part of that labour, which the other has been releaſed from; by this means, the ſentence paſſed on the criminal, both ſerves as an example to others, and contributes to the emolument of the ſtate; it ſaves many lives, that may be ſpent in a manner uſeful to ſociety, and reſtores to the ſervice, ſeveral good ſoldiers, who, by the former practice of hanging, were loſt to it for ever.

With regard to civil, as well as military crimes, it were to be wiſhed, the Britiſh legiſlature, in its great lenity, and wiſdom, would

would commute the penalties, annexed to many civil, and military penal laws, from capital puniſhments, to ſervitude for a number of years, or for life, at home, on the coaſt of Africa, or elſewhere.—Mild as the characteriſtic, and laws of this nation are, yet no metropolis in Europe, exhibits to view ſo many capital puniſhments, as Tyburn affords, nor, with leſs good effect: from the frequency of the puniſhment, and the want of proper ſolemnity, a cartful of human beings, are hanged with as little concern to the ſpectators, or criminals, as if they were a cartful of dogs hung up, to amuſe an aſſembly of Swift's yahoos.

Though we have here deviated a little from our proper ſubject, yet, it may perhaps be deemed ſtill worthy of remark, that whereever publick executions, and puniſhments are frequent, the common people has been obſerved to acquire a greater degree of inſenſibility, and cruelty of diſpoſition, than in places where ſuch ſcenes ſeldom occur. When too often exhibited, they gradually harden the hearts of the ſpectators, and leave them leſs ſuſceptible of the emotions of pity, and com-

commiſeration; feelings, which, of all others, have the greateſt influence on, and are moſt becoming human nature.

" Il eſt pernicieux," ſays Mareſchal de Saxe," " de punir tonjours de mort, un ſoldat " pris en maraude, et ſouvent il eſt pendu pour " un rien; cela fait qu'on ne les arrete pas; " on devroit ſeulement les mettre en chaines " aux prevot."

But in Great Britain, where abſurd cuſtom has gained ſuch footing, as to prove a real tyrant, paramount to law, reaſon, and to thoſe feelings, that are moſt apt to civilize mankind; ſlight faults, as well as infamous crimes, are generally puniſhed, in the army, by cruel, and diſgraceful floggings; whereby the neceſſary diſtinction between the various degrees of guilt, is taken away. Daily experience proves the inefficacy of this practice, which reflects much diſcredit on the injudicious regulations of our military diſcipline. It ſeems, therefore, to be the general wiſh of the community, that the example of the moſt civilized nations, ſhould, in this inſtance, be imitated, by a commutation of thoſe ſevere

puniſhments,

puniſhments, for ſome of a more mild nature.

" Il faut que les chatimens ſoient grands, " pour les grands crimes ſenlement ; mais " pour le reſte, plus ils ſeront doux, plus " promptement vous remedierez aux abus ; " car tout le monde concourerra a les faire " ceſſer." M. Saxe.

To ſubſtitute ſuch penalties, as by the diſgrace attached to them, would afflict the mind, will prove as powerful a check to licentiouſneſs, as ſubjecting the body to cruel laceration, too often inflicted for the moſt trivial offences.

" Il faut prendre garde, de ne point avilir " ceux, qui ne doivent point etre deſhonorans, " car il en faut de'ceux la ; l'on eſt obligé " de paſſer les drapeaux, ſur la tete aux ſol- " dats que avoient paſsé par les Baquettes, " pour leur oter l'idee de l'infamie qui y eſt " attachée. M. Saxe.

Whipping may be properly employed in puniſhing the infamous crime of theft, mutinous behaviour, or a ſecond, or third deſertion in time of peace ; notorious offenders ſhould

ſhould be made ſevere examples of, in order to deter others. But, after having been brought to ſuch degrading puniſhments, they ſhould be drummed out of their regiments, and branded with ſome exterior mark of infamy, to denote their future incapacity for the ſervice.

For all other inferior crimes, let them be puniſhed by impriſonment, for a longer or ſhorter ſpace of time, in chains, or without them, or, by ſtoppage of pay, while confined, or by double duties, or by duties of fatigue, &c. Confinement on bread and water, or on barley bread and water, is the proper, and at the ſame time, phyſical, puniſhment due to habitual drunkenneſs. The Romans uſed to allot barley bread, as the food of military priſoners, eſpecially drunkards. Theſe leſſer puniſhments may be inflicted on the delinquents, by a regimental court-martial of ſubalterns, but let their power extend no further.

When the offence is of ſuch magnitude, as ſeems to deſerve corporal puniſhment, let regimental court-martials then conſiſt of a field officer, two captains, and two ſubalterns. If there is but one field officer preſent, let three captains, and two ſubalterns,

terns, conſtitute a court-martial ; when the inferior rank is more numerous than the ſuperior, in ſuch courts, the priſoner is not ſo apt to be impreſſed with ſufficient awe, and opinion, of the experience of his judges.

As a certain degree of mildneſs, and humanity, is far from being repugnant to good diſcipline, it is ſurely worth while to endeavour, that ſo conſiderable a part of mankind, as by modern policy is obliged to follow a military life, be governed as much by good will, as by dread of ſeverity ; let officers try to inſpire them with ſome ſenſe of honor, and the dignity of their profeſſion ; theſe generous ſentiments, once imbibed, will gradually become the ruling principle of their conduct, and of courſe, no military enterpriſe will prove ſuperior to their courage.

In the government of armies, due ſubordination neceſſarily requires, that a conſiderable diſtinction be kept, through all the gradations of rank : but at the ſame time, it muſt not be forgot, that one of the chief objects of a general's care, as far as it is conſiſtent with duty, ſhould be the intereſt, and happineſs, of thoſe under his command ; and that

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affability, and good humour, may be maintained, without relaxing authority; on the contrary, as they promote attachment, and regard, they will alſo ſtimulate the ſoldier to an exact obedience.

An eaſy familiar air, and an appearance of good-will, ought generally to diſtinguiſh officers, in ſpeaking to their ſoldiers, without ſeeming to give up that reſpect, and deference, due to their ſuperior ſtation.

The behaviour of the German officers, to their ſoldiers, is generally ſo ſevere, and unrelenting, that one would be tempted to think, the ruling principle of their ſervice, tended chiefly to make the lives of the common ſoldiers, as unhappy as poſſible: neither can it be denied, that inſtances of this kind, occur even among our Britiſh officers, though we have the ſatisfaction to obſerve, they are not frequent.

The Germans permit the diſcipline of the cane, on every ſlight occaſion. It is totally prohibited among the French troops, and with great propriety. Perhaps, what improves the phlegmatic German, would have a contrary effect on the lively Frenchman; as it undoubt-

undoubtedly has the worſt, on the high ſpirited Briton, if he is endued with any of the qualities of a good ſoldier. The ſame ſeverity that is requiſite to train a pointer, would ſpoil a greyhound, and would render the courageous maſtiff, ſurly, and intractable.

It is therefore to be wiſhed, that a treatment, ſo unworthy of a Britiſh ſoldier, ſhould, by ſupreme authority, be ſtrictly prohibited. Should the ſoldier be inſenſible of the indignity done him, he ſhould not be reckoned a fit man, for the king's ſervice.

Deſertion, in the Britiſh army, is generally the effect of an inconſtant light diſpoſition, or proceeds from the phrenzy of drunkenneſs, ſeldom from cowardice; frequently repentance, immediately ſucceeds the crime, while the terror of the puniſhment, annexed to it, prevents the return of duty. It is therefore worthy of conſideration, whether ſome alleviation of the penalty, which deſerters incur, by articles of war, except in preſence of the enemy, might not conduce to the intereſt of the ſervice.

Nevertheleſs, it is to be acknowledged, that the mutiny bill, ought not to be too much

much diſarmed of its power, of reſtraining offences, by the terror of puniſhment; but, it is to be wiſhed, this bill deſcribed a greater variety of puniſhments, and adapted each to the degree of offence; death, or ſuch cruel floggings, as ſeem to diſgrace our national character, and diſcipline, are the only alternatives, clearly pointed out, by articles of war; whereas, if other penalties were particulariſed, by thoſe articles; death, and whipping, would not be found neceſſary, once in ten times, ſo often as they are now employed.

But if the provincial plan of recruiting, for a limited term of years, be adopted, it will put an end to deſertion, and, as men more creditable, and of better morals, will be thereby induced to enliſt, the pains of death, and the ſevere whippings, now in practice, will become totally unneceſſary, and obſolete. We never ſee any flogging among the cavalry, ſeldom among the militia, for the above reaſon; indeed, the higher pay of the cavalry, induces more creditable men, in point of circumſtances, and, more ſightly in appearance, to offer themſelves, for that ſervice.

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The Spartans inſtituted a very judicious puniſhment, which operated moſt effectually againſt the cowardice of thoſe that miſbehaved, or fled from the field of battle, without condemning them to death. Such delinquents were never permitted to marry, and were ſubjected to perpetual inſults, and affronts. A puniſhment, which, to all Spartans, appeared more terrible than death, and produced that generally eſtabliſhed principle of honor among them, rather to die, than quit their poſt.

The Romans were exceſſively rigorous, in puniſhing military crimes. Auguſtus himſelf, mild, and humane, as he was, condemned to death, thoſe who quitted their poſt, and fled from their duty. Other emperors, exhibited much more ſhocking inſtances of cruel puniſhments, viz. cutting out out the deſerter's, or other criminal's tongue, lopping off their hands, or cutting off their knee-bone, &c. &c.

A legion of 4000 men, having, without the general's order, plundered the city of Regia, were, by decree of the Roman ſenate, maſſacred, and cut to pieces. They were pro-

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hibited funeral rites, and even their relations were poſitively forbid to wear mourning. Great undoubtedly was the offence, but the enormous puniſhment ſeems to have by far exceeded the crime. A decimation of the legion would have operated with ſufficient force, as an example.

But the ancients in general were too cruel, and ſanguinary in their puniſhments; which perhaps was in a great meaſure owing to the fabulous abſurdity of their mythology, deſcribing their legions of deities, as ſubject to all the paſſions, and weakneſſes of the human mind; but the divine principles of chriſtianity, which, by its doctrine, inculcates the moſt perfect ſyſtem of ſocial benevolence, and moral virtue, being more univerſally promulgated, have very much contributed to civilize mankind, and render them more compaſſionate, and humane, wherever they have been rightly underſtood, and ſtrictly adhered to.

Nevertheleſs, there are inſtances of the moſt ſhocking cruelties perpetrated under pretence of promoting this faith. But in ſuch caſes, the name of Chriſtianity has been, in the

the moſt flagrant manner, proſtituted to the worſt of purpoſes, and made ſubſervient to ſordid avarice—*To low ambition, and the pride of Kings.*

Let the conqueſt of the weſtern world by Spain bear witneſs to the truth of this aſſertion; let it be recorded to the remoteſt ages; let it inſpire the moſt diſtant poſterity, with a juſt horror for thoſe diſgraceful paſſions, which being ſtimulated by ſacerdotal ſuperſtition, and vile hypocriſy, hurried on thoſe Spaniſh free-booters, to ſuch acts of barbarity, as will fix, for ever, an indelible ſtain on the character of that nation.

Having this reproachful example before us, may the wiſdom of Britiſh legiſlation be ſufficiently exerted, in watching the proceedings of the motley government of our eaſtern dominions, to prevent the like ignominious tyranny, and abuſes of delegated power. Some great fortunes have been rapidly acquired there, by means too reprehenſible for open inveſtigation; but it may be more prudent to look forward, and improve, than to be too nicely retroſpective, without correcting

abuſes.—However, in ſupport of the general principle of this ſection, let it be remembered, that magnanimity, and true courage, are ever inſeparably aſſociated with humanity.

SECT. IV.

On Military Rewards.

IF men were ſuch as they ought to be, there would be no neceſſity to uſe either rewards, for promoting virtue, or puniſhments, for reſtraining vice. The pleaſure of doing good, the inexpreſſible delight derived from a conſciouſneſs of having performed a generous or brave action, would carry with it, its own reward, which would alſo have the additional charm, of being independent of any power. But ſentiments ſo elevated are ſeldom to be met with in theory, much leſs in practice.

In this corrupt ſtate of the world, it is therefore become neceſſary, to lead men by their

their foibles, in order to induce them to acquit themſelves of duties the moſt eſſential, and indiſpenſable in human ſociety. As puniſhments, for theſe reaſons, are found abſolutely neceſſary to reſtrain bad men, ſo likewiſe rewards are no leſs eſſential, to confirm, and animate the good.

Honor has ever been a powerful incitement to military valour; the ancients laid the greateſt ſtreſs on its efficacy; they encouraged it with the moſt conſpicuous diſtinctions, manifeſted by various ſymbols. To fill the ſoldier's heart with the ardor of fame, they firſt beſtowed crowns, wove with herbs, or ſhrubs, which were recompences a little burthenſome to the leaſt opulent ſtates, and were then conſidered as objects highly worthy of ambition; but this imaginary value, which cuſtom had ſtamped on them, gradually began to loſe its weight; wherefore, to re-animate ſo noble, and uſeful a principle, they inſtituted triumphs; they erected monuments, or ſtatues; they ordered funeral orations, in praiſe of thoſe, who fell diſtinguiſhed in battle; and poets celebrated their glory in

verſes, that immortalized both the hero, and the poet.

All this made aſtoniſhing impreſſion on minds, thus filled with an ardent love of fame, as thoſe of Greece, and Rome were, who, by this policy, became as fond of ſuch unexpenſive honorary recompences, as we are of penſions, regiments, and military rank, though ſometimes, not earned by military ſervice.

Though we are now many ages removed from thoſe æras alluded to, yet man, if we conſider him, as newly formed by the plaſtic hand of nature, ſhall be always found much the ſame; poſſeſſed of a mind, abounding with the ſeeds of all the virtues, and of all the vices too, and theſe endued with the perpetual principle of germination, through the various ſucceſſions of ages. Experience, the wiſe parent of improvement, found it neceſſary to inſtitute civil policy, or government, as a moſt ſkilful gardener, to cultivate the one ſpecies of ſeed, and to weed the other, as much as poſſible, out of this luxuriant ſoil; rewards, and puniſhments, being the only proper inſtruments, to be uſed in this

proceſs

proceſs of culture. From whence we would deduce an argument of weight, for ſtill reviving ſome honorary incitements to military enterprize, ſimilar to thoſe of the ancients, were it only to render pecuniary ones leſs neceſſary; for no axiom is better founded, than that the ſame cauſes will ever produce the ſame effects.

If we may be allowed ſtill to continue our allegorical genealogy, we will further obſerve, that as luxury, the generally reputed parent of avarice, encreaſed, ſo did theſe honorary diſtinctions, in the ſame degree, become leſs valuable; the Romans, Greeks, Gauls, and other nations, found it therefore neceſſary to adopt other modes of recompenſe. Hence aroſe the practice of giving regular pay to troops. Penſions alſo were aſſigned from the public treaſury, as rewards of diſtinguiſhed actions; and both officers, and ſoldiers, when they attained in ſervice the period of *veterance*, or were deemed unequal to the fatigues of farther ſervice, by wounds, age, or other infirmities, had a certain portion of public lands, aſſigned them for life, in proportion to their ſeveral ranks.

But as all human inſtitutions, however wiſely adapted, are liable to abuſe, advantages were taken of thoſe critical public circumſtances, which proceſs of time produces, ſo that the hereditary poſſeſſion of them was univerſally uſurped.

The order of knighthood, then became the recompence of military ſervice; that of banneret, was the moſt honorable, and had great rank and privileges annexed to it; it continued in uſe 'till late ages.

Even a private ſoldier, who had performed a remarkable action, was rewarded on the ſpot, by his captain, putting a ring of gold, or ſilver, on his finger; and when the exploit was very eminent, the general himſelf aſſiſted at the ceremony, in preſence of the whole army. A mode of recompence, moſt judiciouſly inſtituted, of very inconſiderable expence, and highly worthy of being again revived.

We have entered on this review of the progreſs of military rewards, as they happened ſucceſſively to take place, according as occaſion pointed out to the wiſeſt of the ancients, the neceſſity of ſuch expedients, in order

order to rouſe the ſpirit of military enterpriſe, to fann that noble fire of valour, which is neceſſary to ſupport it, and to keep alive, and confirm both, leſt by want of ſuch fuel, they ſhould languiſh, or perhaps be extinguiſhed. Hence, to obtain this end, they propoſed firſt honorary, and then pecuniary rewards, which all degrees of military rank were entitled to contend for, and partake of; and ſome modern nations have with ſucceſs, for ſome time, wiſely imitated the ancient example, laid before them, to the great improvement of their reſpective ſervices.

Nothing more effectualy cheriſhes emulation, aſſiduity, and good diſcipline, than the well aſcertained hopes, and the fair chance of recompence, " *L'eſperances fait tout en-* " *durer, & tout, entreprendre,*" ſays Mareſchal de Saxe," " *ſi vous l'otez auz mili-* " *taires, vous leur otez l'ame.*" This motive muſt be ſtrengthened by the regular progreſſion of military preferment, in all inſtances, except in caſes of evidently diſtinguiſhed merit, or moſt obvious delinquency. A deviation from this rule would then be applauded by every juſt, and good officer;

officer; but it throws a damp on all military ardor, to ſuperſede the right of ſeniority in ſervice, merely from favour, or intereſt, unſupported by any known teſt of ſuperior military pretenſions.

France, Spain, Auſtria, and other powers, have eſtabliſhed commanderies, governments, penſions, annexing often Orders, inſtituted ſolely in honor of military ſervice, and in favor of officers of all ranks, who have diſtinguiſhed themſelves in action, or become infirm, and ſuperannuated in ſervice. The States-General of the United Provinces too, obſerve a very liberal attention in recompenſing both officers and private men, who have been maimed, grown old, or infirm, in courſe of ſervice; the hoſpital of invalids at Paris, and the colleges of Chelſea and Greenwich, are noble and munificent, eſtabliſhments, in favor of the maimed, or ſuperannuated ſoldier, and ſailor, ſuitable to the honor and dignity of their reſpective nations.

But Great Britain, however diſtinguiſhed for her public bounty, and liberal humanity, in all other inſtances, has not yet paid due attention, to make competent proviſion for maimed officers, or for thoſe, who are worn

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out in ſervice by age, wounds, and many hardſhips. Yet, ſurely, thoſe who fight her battles, deſerve a better kind of treatment. The page of ancient, or modern hiſtory, affords no inſtance of a courage, and reſolution, in ſupporting all the riſques, and fatigues of war, ſuperior to the conduct of the preſent Britiſh army. Had this diſpoſition been wiſely cultivated, and properly conducted, when the number of troops was equal to the enterpriſe, the rebellion of America might have long ſince been reduced, and our preſent wars, with France, and Spain, would in all probability, have been prevented. The ſpirited conduct of the laſt campaign, ſeems to prove the juſtice of the obſervation; that no army was ever qualified to deſerve better of their country, than the preſent Britiſh one.

Theſe kingdoms ſtanding ſo high in rank, and power, amongſt nations, ought ſurely not to be the laſt, and leaſt attentive to relieve, and generouſly provide for this brave claſs of officers. There are ſeveral of them, even in the rank of general officers, and colonels, who find their ſituation very uncomfortable, after a long courſe of ſervice, if they have not had

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the good fortune to meet with friends willing, and of ſufficient influence to ſupport their pretenſion from ſervice, ſo as to obtain regiments, or other eſtabliſhments.

From the inſular ſituation of theſe kingdoms, they contain no frontier towns, few garriſons, and of courſe, few military governments; and even theſe *few* ſeldom or never fall to the ſhare of officers, of the above deſcription. It ſeems therefore worthy of the attention of government, to ſupply thoſe deficiencies, by a mode the leaſt burthenſome to the public; in this, following the example held out to us, by moſt of the other nations of Europe.

When the Britiſh arrangement of military pay was firſt eſtabliſhed, it was ſuitable to the national character, and moſt amply munificent; but the price of all the neceſſaries of life, having quadruply encreaſed ſince that time, its eſtabliſhment of pay is thereby become inferior to that of moſt of the powers of Europe, when the cheapneſs of all their articles of life, is balanced againſt the high value which ours bear; ſo that the difficulty, which the inferior claſs of officers, and the whole

whole ſoldiery have, to ſubſiſt on their preſent pay, is incredible ; nay, it ſeems almoſt incomprehenſible, how they ſubſiſt at all.---We preſume it would be agreeable, not only to the army, but alſo to the nation in general, to ſee the military pay receive ſome little addition, ſo as to enable both officers, and private men, to ſubſiſt a little more competently. *La paye doit etre forte*, ſays the great Mareſchal de Saxe, *ſi vous ne donnez, pas aux officiers des appointements honnetes, vous naurez que des gens riches, qui ſerviront par libertinage, ou des miſerables dont le courage eſt abbatu.* But in the preſent encumbered ſtate of the national revenue, this meritorious purpoſe ſeems almoſt impracticable, without greatly increaſing the public expences. It cannot indeed be accompliſhed, without ſome ; but it is practicable, with much leſs, than is generally imagined.

It is therefore propoſed, in the further progreſs of this plan, to point out the means, not only of making ſome addition to the pay of the army, but alſo of making ſome proviſion for our maimed officers, and ſuperannuates, who have, by long ſervice, attained a due term of veterance.

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The taſk is arduous, yet we ſhall exert our utmoſt endeavours to make it obvious, in the courſe of this, and the following ſection; but we muſt here premiſe ſome few explanatory obſervations, before we proceed farther in this new and important arrangement.

1ſt. It muſt be obſerved, that theſe five ſections, containing our Plan of military improvements, form ſuch a chain of connexion, that if the regulations propoſed in the firſt ſection, be not adopted, all the reſt muſt neceſſarily fall to the ground.

2dly. Let it be obſerved, that it is only by the ſaving and re-application of ſums already granted, and by obtaining a moderate aid from Parliament, and a ſmall aſſiſtance from the Crown, that we mean to conſtitute our miſcellaneous general fund for ſupplying the bounty money to provincial volunteers, as has been mentioned in that ſection; as alſo for affording a ſmall addition to the pay of the officers and ſoldiers of the army: and we further intend, that this fund ſhall procure ſmall penſions to a certain number of maimed officers, and diſabled veterans,

veterans, proportionable to their reſpective ranks, and according to what our general funds can properly admit of.

It muſt be remembered, that in the firſt ſection we propoſed, that the whole non-effective money of the army, ſhall be annually collected, and paid on the firſt of March, into a Receiver-General's office, appointed for this good purpoſe.

We obſerved in the ſame ſection, that by adopting our provincial Plan of recruiting on a limited term of ſervice, (for five years at moſt) there would be no further occaſion for an out-penſion liſt, as we ſhould then have no ſuperannuated ſoldiers to diſcharge and maintain after the death of thoſe now on liſt. Fix the expence of the out-penſion liſt, as it now ſtands, and enact by law the appropriation of the ſum it amounts to, and apply it with the non-effective funds, to accumulate for the purpoſe; this article of our funds will be very little productive for the firſt two or three years, but afterwards it will gradually increaſe.

It muſt be here remarked, that by ſuſpending

ing the out-penſions, we mean not that our diſabled ſoldiers ſhould be neglected; but as by this plan of recruiting, there will be no old ſoldiers to penſion, the expence of that liſt cannot be better applied than to the benefit of the ſoldiers who continue to ſerve; for we ſuppoſe, that Chelſea College will be ſufficient to contain all the ſoldiers really diſabled; and ſhould it not, the ſurplus might ſtill be put on penſion, but ſuch *ſurplus*, if any, will be very ſmall.

The next means propoſed for increaſing our funds, is a ſtoppage of two days pay from the arrears of the non-commiſſioned officers, and private ſoldiers, in the courſe of every year, which they will chearfully afford for the purpoſe of augmenting their pay to a greater proportion. As alſo three days pay annually from the whole number of officers of the army, of every rank, wherever ſtationed, at home, or abroad, from all officers on the ſtaff, and from all military governors. Moreover, let all thoſe who bear great and lucrative offices in conſequence of the military eſtabliſhment, contribute annually

nually, *ad libitum*, to the funds deſtined for this meritorious purpoſe.

With regard to the officers of the army, there is precedent for ſuch a ſtoppage, in reſpect to the penſions of officers widows; but were there none, it is impoſſible to conceive, that either officer, or ſoldier, could be ſo inſenſible, as to deem this ſmall ſtoppage any hardſhip, conſidering the general advantage that is to be derived to the army, *en gros*, from the propoſed plan, of which this article is a neceſſary conſtituting part. It is like receiving one penny, in order to return one pound.

The aid which we moſt humbly ſuggeſt to be granted by the Crown, in favour of this great purpoſe, is, that his Majeſty, actuated by his royal bounty, and paternal regard for his troops, and conſulting the moſt proper and expeditious method of levying them, as well as their competent ſubſiſtence, when levied, would be graciouſly pleaſed to aſſign for this purpoſe, his ſhare in the ſeizures of all contraband and ſmuggled goods, which, as matters now ſtand, it is apprehended, produce very little to the royal purſe, by reaſon

of the great embezzlements of theſe ſeizures, which might in a great meaſure be prevented, by ſome proper reſtraints, which we may ſuggeſt, as means of improving this fund.—As the Crown has liberally given up its ſhare in the prizes taken at ſea, during war, in favor of the navy, it is hoped, that in this inſtance, (which is in ſome degree ſimilar, as many of the ſeizures are made by military aſſiſtance) it will not be leſs indulgent in contributing to promote a meaſure, tending to improve the eſtabliſhment of the army.

There is another article tending to augment this fund, which will find its proper place, in the next ſection; we ſhall therefore defer enlarging on it, until the ſubject matter of that ſection comes to be diſcuſſed.

We ſhall alſo endeavour in this, and the next ſection, to give a groſs computation of the expence, to be incurred, by adopting theſe meliorations of military pay, and penſions; but it is impoſſible in the preſent ſtate of the funds, intended for theſe purpoſes, to aſcertain exactly their amount, when accumulated; yet, we have reaſon to think,

they

they would very nearly anſwer the great ends, for which they are intended. There would undoubtedly be ſome deficiency; ſome ſupply, though indeed very inconſiderable, would be found neceſſary. But it is hoped that Parliament, in its great wiſdom, would deem it an object of national concern, and worthy of its care, to grant this inconſiderable ſupply.

As this ſection treats of military rewards, it ſeems proper, before it is concluded, to ſet down a ſhort ſtate, and calculation of the number, and value of the penſions, propoſed for the maimed, and ſuperannuated officers, who, by the accidents of war, or the length of their ſervice, are now become incapable to ſerve.

It is propoſed, that the maimed officer, of any rank, or age whatever, ſhall be entitled to partake of this eſtabliſhment, as well as the ſuperannuated officer; but as it is impoſſible, that all thoſe who may claim the benefit thereof, can obtain it, it appears neceſſary to limit the number, and value of theſe recompenſive annuities, which, it is to

be hoped, both the royal, and national benevolence, will judge proper, and concur in granting.

At the ſame time, a period of ſervice ſhall be fixed, aſcertaining, when officers may be ſuppoſed to have attained the term of veterance; though it muſt be obſerved, that officers in the rank of captains, and ſubalterns, being generally young men, cannot of courſe be conſidered as veterans; but as many of them by wounds, or loſs of limbs, may be diſabled from continuing any longer in the ſervice, they may very juſtly claim the benefit of this eſtabliſhment, according to their ſeveral ranks.

Regulation and Eſtimate of the Eſtabliſhment propoſed in favor of Veteran, and maimed Officers.

		l.	*s.*	*d.*
40 years ſervice is to be conſidered as the term of veterance, for this rank.	To 20 ſuperannuated, or maimed officers, (if ſo many there are) who have ſerved 40 years, and upwards, and are now in the rank of general officers, or colonels, without regiments, or any other eſtabliſhment, but that of half pay, inferior to their rank, let there be allowed 210*l.* per annum each, with their half pay.	4200	0	0
37 years are the term of veterance, for this rank.	To 10 Lieutenant-Colonels, who have abtained a 37 years term of veterance, and chooſe to retire with half-pay, let there be allowed with it, 100*l.* per annum each.	1000	0	0
35 years are the term of veterance, for Majors.	To 10 Majors, who have attained a term of veterance, of 35 years, ditto, let there be allowed 80*l.* per annum each, with their half-pay.	800	0	0
	To 25 Captains, who have been obliged to retire on half-pay, by loſs of limbs, or otherwiſe diſabled from ſerving, let there be allowed 40*l.* each per annum, with their half-pay.	1000	0	0
	To 50 ſubalterns, ditto, let there be allowed 30*l.* per annum each, with their half-pay.	1500	0	0
		£. 8500	0	0

Thoſe officers, who are the ſubject of our preſent conſideration, juſtly claim this favor, and attention, by reaſon of their long ſervice to the Crown, and the great hardſhips ſuſtained therein; many of them are Gentlemen, well born, and of good education, whoſe youthful choice, had it been guided by experience, would have led them to purſue ſome liberal profeſſion, which might have aſcertained them an ample fortune, and placed them in ſuch circumſtances, as would have rendered the decline of their life, infinitely more comfortable.

But it is to be hoped, that the royal bounty of the Crown, and the liberality of Parliament, will ſo far operate in their favor, as to adopt the meaſures above pointed out, for their better eſtabliſhment; and that they will not be left under ſuch diſtreſſing circumſtances, as would make them repent the choice they ſo imprudently made, when they engaged in a profeſſion, that compenſates their toils, and wounds, only with a ſcanty incompentent ſubſiſtence, and gives them

them occaſion, in their old age, to cry out with Virgil's ———*Miles gravis Annis*;

O fortunati nimium, ſua ſi bona norint,
Agricolæ.

SECT. V.

On the reduction of an Army after War, to a proper Peace Eſtabliſhment.

IN opening this Section, it ſeems requiſite to obſerve, that towards the end of laſt war, peace became neceſſary to both France, and Spain, almoſt on any conditions; and Great Britain, with more generoſity, than good policy, granted it on the moſt liberal terms.

The uſe they made of this peace was, to carry on ſuch ſecret preparations for another war, as might afford them the chance of better ſucceſs, and enable them to wait for favourable contingencies, which occured too ſoon, by means of the American rebellion.

They reform'd their naval, and military armaments, on plans calculated for ſpeedy augmentations thereof; whilſt Britain, generally more ſincere, than political, laid down her conquering arms, as if ſhe never intended to reſume them; leaning ſecurely on the peace ſhe had juſt made, without paying due attention to that juſt, and well eſtabliſhed maxim in politics, viz. that the moſt effectual means of obtaining a good peace, is to keep fully armed; and of preſerving it, to adopt ſuch plans in reducing both naval, and military forces, as ſhall enable a nation to augment them occaſionally, in the moſt ſpeedy, and effectual manner poſſible.

But having been ſo often deceived by thoſe Powers, now combined in war againſt us, it is to be hoped this nation will, in future, keep herſelf more providently guarded, and conſider, that, whatever peace ſhe ſhall now conclude with the Bourbon Houſe, (of more than Punic faith) will be obſerved by it, only as a ceſſation from hoſtilities, which it will not fail to renew, at a favorable occaſion.

Therefore, the moſt effectual means that

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can be adopted to preſerve peace, and counteract the dangerous policy of the nations, under the government of that Houſe, ſo radically inimical to Great Britain, is to diſarm only to ſuch a degree, and on ſuch an improved plan of peace eſtabliſhment, as ſhall enable her to arm fully, and in the moſt expeditious manner poſſible, on any emergency.

In regard to the military eſtabliſhment, (for the naval ſhall be the ſubject of the next ſection) no mode of reduction, can ſo effectually anſwer this important purpoſe, as that which the illuſtrious Count de Saxe, one of the greateſt of our modern generals, ſtrenuouſly recommends, viz. to keep on foot, a great number of regiments, but reduced to a very low eſtabliſhment; by which means, the nation will not incur any very conſiderable expence, above the eſtimate of her uſual peace eſtabliſhment.

The propriety of this meaſure he ſupports by the following reaſons:

1ſt. It is not ſo eaſy to form officers to diſcipline, and command, as to make men obey, and teach them the uſe of arms.

2dly. By

2dly. By having a few well diſciplined ſoldiers, with their officers, in each company, when an augmentation becomes neceſſary, it is much eaſier to form ſuch a corps for immediate ſervice, by engrafting, as it were, new men on the old ſtock, than to raiſe entire new regiments.

The ſolidity of theſe reaſons is ſo obvious, that they ſeem of ſufficient weight to recommend the adoption of the mode of reducing our army at the end of the war, which, together with our provincial manner of recruiting, will, by the power, and ſecurity they afford, render a peace more permanent, and put this nation in a poſture of immediate offence, or defence, againſt the ſecret, or open efforts, of any agreſſor.

Suppoſe the exigencies of the preſent war, ſhould make it neceſſary to encreaſe our military eſtabliſhment, to 24 regiments of cavalry, and 120 battalions of infantry; (which is inferior to that of laſt war) and, that the belligerent powers being exhauſted, and tired of the conteſt, have at laſt reſolved to reſtore peace to Europe.

In this caſe, let the regiments of cavalry be

be reduced to two officers, and 15 men, per troop. The field officers troops, to have one lieutenant each, two of the other troops to have a captain, and one cornet each. The ſixth troop to be commanded by a lieutenant, and a cornet.

The youngeſt captain, 3 lieutetenants, and 3 cornets, to be reduced, but to be *en ſecond*, on their reſpective regiments, that they may be replaced in them, as vacancies happen, and according to their ſeniority.

Theſe officers, *en ſecond*, to be allowed, at the following rates of pay: The captain, 6s. and 6d. the lieutenant 4s. the cornet, 3s. per day.

The regiments of cavalry will, by this means, conſiſt of 12 officers, and 90 private men, which is undoubtedly a low eſtabliſhment, but ſufficient for the duty in peace, and for the purpoſe of forming recruits to the ſervice, when an augmentation becomes neceſſary.

The ſtaff of each cavalry regiment, to conſiſt of one adjutant, one ſurgeon, and two quarter maſters; all the other ſtaff officers, to be reduced to half-pay.

The

The regiments of foot to be reduced to two officers, and 24 men, rank and file, per company; the eſtabliſhment of each corps will then be 20 officers, and 240 private men; a lieutenant being appointed to each field officer's company, and enſigns to thoſe commanded by captains. But in this low eſtabliſhment of regiments, four captains are ſufficient for each corps; therefore let the three youngeſt captains be reduced, and the three oldeſt lieutenants appointed to command their companies, with an enſign to each of them.

Theſe diſbanded officers to be reduced *en ſecond*, on their reſpective regiments, and to be re-eſtabliſhed in them, as vacancies happen in their ſeveral ranks. The captains, *en ſecond*, to be allowed 6s. per day, the lieutenants, 3s. and the enſigns, 2s. The ſtaff of each corps to conſiſt of one adjutant, and one ſurgeon; the other ſtaff officers to be reduced to half-pay.

The eſtabliſhment of a regiment of cavalry, will ſtand in number of officers, and men, as follow, viz.

Field

Regimental Officers.	Field Officers	3	Officers en ſecond.	Captain -	1
	Captains	2		Lieutenants	3
	Lieutenants	3		Cornets - - -	3
	Cornets	3			

Staff on full-pay. 1 ſurgeon, 1 adjutant, 2 quarter-maſters, 6 ſerjeants, and 90 privates.

Peace eſtabliſhment of a regiment of infantry, will conſiſt of the following number of officers, and private men, viz.

Regimental officers.	Field officers	3	Officers en ſecond.	Captains	3
	Captains -	4		Lieutenants	5
	Captain-Lieut.	1		Enſigns	3
	Lieutenants	6			
	Enſigns .... -	6			

Staff-officers.	Adjutant	1		Serjeants - - - -	10
	Surgeon -	1		Drummers and fifes -	10
	Mate	1		Rank and file - - -	240

The 7 battalions of foot guards, to be reduced to 2 ſerjeants, and 42 rank and file, per company, which, at the rate of 420 men, per battalion, the three regiments will then conſiſt of 2,920 men.

The troops of horſe, and grenadier guards, to have a proportionable reduction.

By this means, the general ſtate of the whole military peace eſtabliſhment, will produce,

produce, by computation, the following eſtimate, as to numbers, viz.

	Rk.&File.
Horſe grenadier, and foot guards, rank and file, —	3200
Cavalry, 24 regiments, privates, —	2160
120 battalions of infantry, rank and file, at 260 per battalion	
Including 10 ſerjeants, 10 drummers and fifes, amount to	31,200
Total peace eſtabliſhment,	36,560
On Britiſh eſtabliſhment, 21,300	
On Iriſh ditto, — 15,260	
36,560	

But ſhould America be reduced, a greater military eſtabliſhment, will undoubtedly become neceſſary, to ſupport the King's authority, againſt the encroachments of any party whatever, that may prevail there; nor can it be conſiſtent with reaſon, and ſound policy, to pretend to retain permanently, without a military force, the dominion of ſuch extenſive, and remote territories, which will encreaſe in population, and commerce, with aſtoniſhing rapidity, when peace is reſtored to them.

Should

Should America return to her allegiance, ſhe will, by her revived extenſive trade, be very capable of maintaining ſuch a number of troops, as will be neceſſary for the effectual ſupport of Britiſh civil government. Had proper care been taken to keep there, a competent military force, from the end of laſt war, or previous to the ſtamp-act being paſt, that tax would have been peaceably received, and theſe colonies preſerved, from the complicated horrors of civil war.

In this caſe, the cavalry may be doubled, by an augmentation of each regiment; and the regiments of foot, augmented to 400 men each, when all officers, *en ſecond*, may be re-eſtabliſhed; which will produce an army for European, and American ſervice, conſiſting of, cavalry, 4320. Infantry, 48,000 men. From this encreaſed army, 18 or 20,000 foot, and 2000 cavalry, may well be ſpared for American ſervice, to be recruited, and paid by the colonies.

But as the French proverb obſerves: *la meſiance eſt la mere de la ſureté*; it may become a proper precaution to ſee, that the officers be gene-

generally natives of Great Britain, and that 2 or 3 regiments berelieved every year, by ſending the like number from Europe, and bringing as many from thence, home. However, this propoſition of ſo large an augmentation, and the regulation of it, is grounded only on the ſuppoſition of America being reduced to the king's peace, an event as yet dodbtful, but devoutly to be wiſhed, by the real friends of both countries.

But leaving this ſuppoſition, let us return to the conſideration of our military eſtabliſhment, in time of peace, a ſubject which, by reaſon of the preſent formidable alliance, againſt this nation, and the jealouſy, which the other neighbouring ſtates ſeem to entertain of its greatneſs, becomes of infinite importance to our preſent, and future intereſts.

The above computation of a peace eſtabliſhment, for Europeon ſervice only, will exceed our military eſtabliſhment, at the commencement of laſt peace, by 4160 men; which is but a ſmall augmentation, when we conſider what we have to dread from the combination of ſo many enemies. The further purpoſe of this ſection, is to point out the

means

means of making this augmentation, as well as the propoſed reforms of eſtabliſhment, and of ſaving, at the ſame time, conſiderable expences to the ſtate.

To prevent a multiplicity of calculations, which is often unpleaſant to the reader, we will, for inſtance, ſtate the different eſtimates of the infantry only, on this improved plan of peace eſtabliſhment; and compare it with the different eſtimates of the peace eſtabliſhment of the infantry, at the concluſion of laſt war, and to abreviate theſe calculations ſtill more, we will ſtate only, *en gros*, the number of men, and ſums of money their ſeveral eſtabliſhments amount to, which we apprehend, will be found pretty exact, on more particular examination.

		£ s. d.
To the full pay of 120 battalions of infantry, including 2400 commiſſioned officers of all ranks, and 31,560 men rank and file, at the rate of 20 officers, and 260 men per battalion, including non-commiſſioned officers.		752,520 0 0
To the reduced pay of 1320 officers *en ſecond.* —	l. s. d. 85,410 0 0	
To half pay to 120 chaplains, and 120 quarter-maſters.	11,680 0 0	
		97,090 0 0
Total expence of military eſtabliſhment on reduction to this plan.		849,610 0 0
But if the Britiſh eſtabliſhment of the army is fixed at a peace, to 21,300 men, then the Britiſh expence of infantry eſtabliſhment will amount only to, or about	485,528 0 0	
And the Iriſh eſtabliſhment of the army, at 15,260 men, with officers, will amount per ann. to the ſum of	364,082 0 0	

Eſtimate of Military Eſtabliſhment, at the Commencement of laſt Peace.

To the full pay of 70 battalions of foot, including 30 officers, 30 ſerjeants, 20 drums, and 450 men rk. and file per bat.	767,300 0 0	
Eſtimate of half pay to the officers of 58 battalions reduced at the end of the war; but as ſome few of them had only 5 or 6 companies, we ſhall therefore ſtate them at 54 compleat battalions.	137,381 0 0	
		904,681 0 0
Balance exceſs of laſt peace eſtabliſhment above that which is propoſed by this plan of reducing the army:		£55,071 0 0

By

By theſe eſtimates, if calculated with any degree of preciſion, and we apprehend, they cannot be very far wrong, it will appear, we have proved full as much, as was at firſt propoſed; for this plan not only maintains 4160 ſoldiers, above the eſtabliſhment at laſt peace; but in place of an expenſive, neglected, half-pay liſt, it ſubſtitutes a liſt of officers, *en ſecond*, annexed to their reſpective corps, to be re-eſtabliſhed, as vacancies happen in them, and in mean time they poſſeſs an allowance, a little better than half-pay, which it is well known, is inſufficient, for the ſupport of the loweſt mechanic, much leſs of a gentleman. 120 battalions too, are kept on full pay, ready to be augmented, by the moſt effectual and expeditious mode of recruiting, when any hoſtile attempts are likely to be made by any nation whatever, againſt Great Britain, or its dependencies; as in this caſe, 120,000 men may, in a few months time, be ready, and fit to take the field.—Such will be the great conſequences of adopting this plan, with this additional advantage, that all thoſe improved arrangements, are to be made at

leſs expence, than the laſt peace eſtabliſhment amounted to, by a ſaving of £54,902.

It farther propoſes, at next reduction of the army, that there be no other addition to the half-pay liſt, than that of providing for the reduced quarter-maſters, and chaplains. Whilſt regiments are on the low eſtabliſhment, as to men, a quarter-maſter-ſerjeant, is ſufficient to do the duty of a quarter-maſter, in each regiment.

It is not from any diſregard to the reſpectable function of the chaplains, that we here propoſe to ſuſpend their office, and one half of their pay, when peace is reſtored; but the neceſſities of the ſtate require, that every ſaving of expence be made, that ſeems practicable, without prejudice to public ſervice.

Wherever ſoldiers are quartered in Great Britain, or Ireland, they are generally ordered to attend divine ſervice, in the pariſh churches of their quarters, and the chaplains are ſo ſenſible of this, that it is ſeldom found neceſſary for them to attend their corps; many of them have livings, or curacies; when their regiments are ordered abroad, or when they

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are ordered to attend them at home, they generally ſend ſubſtitutes, to whom they allow one half of their pay; all which being the caſe, they evidently looſe nothing, by being reduced to half-pay.

For every regiment of cavalry, on the peace eſtabliſhment, of 90 men, it has been obſerved, two quarter-maſters will be ſufficient, which will occaſion 96 of them to be reduced to half-pay, with 24 chaplains. Now, by reducing the chaplains, and quarter-maſters of the infantry, 120 of each office will alſo be placed on half-pay, and by this means, a ſaving made to the revenue of a ſum, amounting nearly to 18,040l. per annum.

But, it ispropoſed,that the ſum thus ſaved*, be thrown in with the other funds, intended for ſupplying bounty money, to Provincial volunteers, and for augmenting the pay of the army, when its reduction to a peace eſtabliſhment takes place. At preſent, the expences of the war are ſo great, that it be-

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* N. B. This is the ſum alluded to in the foregoing ſection, as an article of fund for recruiting, &c.

comes the indiſpenſible duty of every good ſubject, whether in civil, or military character, to bear chearfully his ſhare of the public burden, and hardſhips; beſides, as ſoldiers on foreign ſervice, have juſt now the benefit of receiving the king's proviſions, they are not ſo much diſtreſſed to procure ſubſiſtence, in time of war, as in peace, when their ſcanty 5d. per day, is all they receive for the ſupply of food, and a conſiderable part of their apparel.

If the propoſed funds and aids, above mentioned, be granted, it is intended, out of them, to augment each ſoldier's pay, one penny per day; each ſubaltern's, 6d. per day; each captain's, 1s. a major's, 1s. 6d. a lieutenant-colonel's, 2s. per day; a colonel's, 3s. all which amounts, annually, only to 6661. 2s. 6d. for a regiment reduced to the peace eſtabliſhment.

The Weſt-India Iſlands, in conſideration, that the king's pay is inadequate to the expences of the neceſſaries of life, in theſe iſlands, grant a very liberal allowance, in addition to the pay of the troops in garriſon there; it is to be hoped each county, and large

large city, following ſo laudable an example, will aſſeſs themſelves, to the ſmall amount of 666l. 2s. 6d. in favor of the regiments, allotted to receive recruits from, and bear the name of, the reſpective county, or city, they are appointed for, as a further augmentation of military pay: ſo inconſiderable a ſum will be little felt, as an expence to a county, or great commercial city, eſpecially when it is conſidered, both by peer, and peaſant, that they are thereby beſtowing a ſmall gratuity, on their reſpective ſons, brothers, or other relations of all degrees and ranks, engaged in a common cauſe, *the ſervice* of their country; by whoſe valor, and toils, exerted in all the different quarters of the globe, every individual partakes of the great advantages, ariſing from common ſecurity, national honor, and extenſive commerce.

The liberality, which has always hitherto diſtinguiſhed the character of Britons, will not, it is hoped, in this ſingle inſtance, dwindle into that contracted parſimony, which unrelentingly ſuffers the nervous arm, of the brave ſoldier, to wither and decay in its natural vigor, by indigence; or drives him,

through want, to criminal exceſſes; whilſt the laurel of victory is yet on his brow, and flouriſhes with ſuch verdure, that even a Roman, when Rome was in her greateſt ſplendor, might glory to wear it.

Such is the preſent military ſtate of Europe, that Great Britain muſt either maintain an army of its own brave natives, on a proper eſtabliſhment, and adopt a fixed plan for its occaſional reduction, and ſpeedy augmentation, or be in danger of becoming a province to ſome continental deſpotic power.

Away, then with thoſe groundleſs jealouſies, which ſome illiberal minds ſcruple not to harbour, declaring, that they regard the army with a ſuſpicious eye, as apt to become the inſtrument of deſpotiſm. Let it be known to them, that the hearts of the Britiſh army, whilſt they glow with the firmeſt loyalty to their virtuous, truly patriot ſovereign, ſtill cheriſh an inextinguiſhable ardor, which, on neceſſary occaſion, would kindle into enthuſiaſm, in ſupport of the conſtitutional liberty of Great Britain, to whoſe intereſts they feel themſelves bound by as ſtrong, and juſt attachments, as any ſubjects whatever. Hiſtory records

records no inſtance of a Britiſh army, attempting to ſubvert the conſtitution of their country; on the contrary, they reſtored it once, when overturned: and preſerved it a ſecond time, when in danger.

The inefficacy of the preſent mode of recruiting, is ſufficiently evinced by the incompleat ſtate of the old regiments, during the courſe of this war, and is likely to continue ſo, unleſs ſome more effectual plan of levies be adopted. But, as long as the preſent one is perſiſted in, it muſt prove an inſurmountable obſtacle, to the ſpeedy operations of war; and reſtrain the hands of miniſtry, from attempting any extenſive plans of attacking, and diſtreſſing the enemy.

However laudable the ſpirit the people have ſhewn towards the internal defence of theſe kingdoms, againſt foreign invaſion, it is certain, they have ſhewn very little inclination to riſque their lives abroad. What ſucceſs then can be expected from beating up for volunteers? eſpecially, when ſo little inducement is held out to them, either by preſent profit, or future privileges, which

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in juſtice ought to be offered, at the final period of a ſtipulated term of ſervice.

When new corps are raiſed, no ſort of eſtabliſhment will ſo effectually anſwer the purpoſe of military ſervice, as that of levies by battalion; the appointment of field officers, forms a proper check on the recruiting ſervice, both as to the fitneſs of the men for military duty, and the proper diſcipline of them.

In the laſt war, recourſe was had to the expedient of raiſing independent companies; they were compleated, reviewed, and approved of: they were then ordered to Germany, as drafts for compleating the regiments on ſervice there: when they arrived, what was the conſequence?— one half of them were found unfit for ſervice, and remanded back again.

It ought to be conſidered, that Captains who have the chief command of theſe independent little corps, are themſelves recruiting officers; if they inliſt an indifferent recruit at a cheap rate, they cannot well refuſe one of the ſame ſort, inliſted by a ſubaltern;

ſubaltern; and with the advantage of better dreſs, they are both paſſed among numbers, on a ſuperficial review.

When Europe was leſs civilized, and much leſs informed in the military art, than at preſent, the firſt rude eſſay towards maintaining ſtanding armies, was to appoint independent companies; but as the cultivation of ſciences gradually gained ground, the military art improved in a proportional degree; and then, independent companies were ſoon found to be totally inexpedient, for any good purpoſe of ſervice.

As there was no intermediate check betwixt the prince, or general, and the captains of theſe little corps, which at the ſame time became very numerous; when armies of force were required, they were of courſe, neceſſarily formed into regiments, and had field officers appointed to them, who became anſwerable to the prince, or general, for their better diſcipline, good appearance, and more regular conduct.

The raiſing of theſe independent companies has long ſince been laid aſide, in almoſt every nation. Such is the general conviction

viction of the inexpediency of this ſort of military eſtabliſhment. Yet Great Britain more attached than any other country to ancient cuſtom, by which ſhe ſubjects herſelf to real inconveniences, to avoid trifling innovations, ſtill continues to maintain ſeveral of theſe independent companies, and ſometimes levies more of them: though every officer of rank, who happens to have any of them under his command, complains of their diſſolute habits, and of their non-compliance with rules of diſcipline, as well as of the bad example they give to other troops.

But, before we conclude this, the laſt ſection of our Military Plan; we ſhall juſt obſerve, that there is ſtill another national loſs, ariſing from the preſent mode of recruiting, which does not diſtinguiſh whether a man offering to inliſt, is an artiſan, or the father of a large family, that muſt become deſtitute by his becoming a ſoldier, either in ſober folly, or the phrenzy of drunkenneſs. It ſeems highly proper to prevent, as much as poſſible, the pernicious conſequences of ſuch an indiſcriminate method of levying men; a method, which in the firſt place,

place, is unneceſſary, and is moreover, the worſt policy that can be adopted by a commercial ſtate: ſince every one knows, better men for the ſervice can be procured by the deliberate choice of the collective body of gentlemen in each county and pariſh, who can beſt judge what men may be ſpared with the leaſt inconvenience, and are the moſt agreeable to the deſcription given in the act of Parliament.

At any rate, the inliſting of men to ſerve for life, to ſay nothing of its being repugnant to the characteriſtic of the people, and to the nature of their government, is to the laſt degree unfavourable to the intereſts of a nation, whoſe proſperity chiefly depends on cultivating the arts, and promoting commerce. For, theſe produce the ſinews of war, and give ſupport to arms; which again, in their turn, afford protection to commerce and to arts; thus becoming of reciprocal advantage to each other, by the mutual intercourſe, of exchanging effectual protection, for liberal ſupport.

It ſeems therefore abſolutely neceſſary, in the preſent ſtate of affairs in Europe, to pay a ſerious and due attention to thoſe three eſ-

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ſential objects, which are the pivots, whereupon hinges the whole ſyſtem of Britiſh proſperity, and ſoundeſt policy, *viz.* the cultivation of arts, commerce, and arms: now all this is to be done with ſuch ſteady and unremitting care, as to prevent their intereſts claſhing with each other, whether in peace or in war; otherwiſe they will alternately languiſh and decay, according as the balance is allowed to preponderate in favour of the one, or of the other. But nothing can be more effectually conducive, to ſtrengthen our arms for the protection of our commercial intereſts, than to adopt a fixed plan of provincial levies, with ſuch other improved regulations, as ſhall appear neceſſary, for the occaſional ſpeedy augmentation, and ſupport of the army.

PLAN

PLAN II.

OR,

SECT. VI.

Propoſing an effectual Method of Manning the Navy, and of preventing our Seamen from going into Foreign Service, at the End of the War, &c. &c.

THE extenſive and greatly improved military eſtabliſhments of the neighbouring nations ſince the commencement of this century, as we have obſerved in the preceding ſections, ought to point out to Great Britain, the abſolute neceſſity ſhe is now under, of giving the utmoſt attention to the improvement and extenſion of her's, in ſome degree of proportion with their's, otherwiſe her ſtrength and power will prove by ſo much the lighter in the balance.

But,

But, however neceſſary this meaſure may be for the protection of all her widely extended rights of dominion, there is ſtill an object of attention more important to her due weight in the great ſcale of nations, aſſigned her by the ſupreme ruler of them all, at the firſt formation of the univerſe, when ſhe was placed in an inſular ſituation. Such a ſituation ſeems wiſely intended for the purpoſe of intruſting her with the chief dominion of the ocean, that ſhe might ſway the Trident, and thereby not only promote her own aggrandizement, but alſo, by her mild and equitable uſe thereof, communicate to others the benefits, which a well regulated commercial intercourſe beſtows, by its tendency *to* refine and civilize mankind.

But unbounded ambition and avarice, are vices common to certain nations, as to individuals; by their baneful influence, the natural and immemorial rights of poſſeſſion become firſt, objects of intruſion, and then, of conteſt; which powerful armaments alone, can decide and maintain.

If Britain, however, will be true to her own rights and intereſts, her inhabitants ought, in this great conteſt, to lay aſide all the animoſity of domeſtic faction, and unite, as it were, with one heart and one hand, in wiſely exerting their natural powers of offence, and defence. She may then defy almoſt the whole world in arms, when ſhe amply and ſpiritedly pours forth, both her naval and military forces, on her intruding foes.

Extraordinary circumſtances of war, demand extraordinary exertions; the whole powers of the nation ought therefore to be rendered active for one or two campaigns, rather than be protracted as the preſent, into four or five languid, undeciſive ones.

Procraſtination, under ſuch circumſtances, muſt neceſſarily prove ruinous, even though victory ſhould at laſt declare herſelf in our favour. Hiſtory affords no inſtance of a war maintained on ſo diſtant a theatre, which, in courſe of a few more campaigns, may put us in the ſituation of the Greeks, when they were — *Vainqueurs des Troyens, & gemiſſant de leurs victoires.*

Regulations calculated ſome centuries ago, to anſwer Emergencies of ſtate, much leſs urgent than the preſent, and which were even then deficient in good policy, cannot fail to be inadequate to the preſent momentous exigencies of war.

It has been obſerved in the preceding plan of military eſtabliſhment, that the uſual mode of ſupplying the army with recruits, has been totally inſufficient for the purpoſe, has fettered the hands of government, and cramped the execution of their plans of war: in like manner the odious, impolitic meaſure, ſo long perſiſted in, of ſupplying the navy with ſeamen, has always proved precarious, unpopular, and pernicious, and now, is totally inadequate to the augmented demands of more extenſive ſervice, ſince it retards its progreſs, which ought to be conducted on an ample ſcale, with promptitude and alertneſs. In fact, if our operations are not carried on in this manner, how can we entertain any hope of ſucceſs, eſpecially when we conſider the increaſed and improved ſtate of the marine of the nations combined againſt us.

Let

Let therefore, the wiſdom of the legiſlature, and of government, endeavour by all poſſible exertions, to concert and eſtabliſh ſome more effectual means of readily ſupplying the navy, as well as the army, with men at this criſis, when our very exiſtence as a nation, ſeems to depend on the ſucceſs of our arms.

The impreſs mode of ſupplying the navy with men, muſt ſurely be very deficient, as the official aſſertion of a noble lord, of high authority, and great knowledge in his department, is ſtill freſh in every man's memory. His lordſhip declared in the ſenate, not long ago, that he could build ſhips much faſter, than he could man them; and this ſeems to be confirmed as a real fact, to the conviction of every well informed perſon.

It is therefore high time, to contrive and purſue ſome other means of ſuppling the navy with ſeamen, than by the oppreſſive and incompetent meaſure of impreſs, as alſo, of increaſing their number; nor ſhould we neglect adopting ſuch methods as may preſerve them for the national ſervice, on

all Emergencies, and at the ſame time render them uſeful inſtruments, in promoting our commerce in peace; which two grand purpoſes can be effectually anſwered only by removing their real grievances, and by beſtowing ſome permanent gratuity, ſufficient to attach them intirely to the ſervice of their country, in preference to that of any other nation.

To this end let it be enacted by Parliament:

1ſt. That every ſea-port town, fiſhing village, and pariſh extended immediately on the ſea coaſts of Great Britain, and Ireland, ſhall aſſeſs themſelves annually in war, to raiſe the number of ſeamen voted by Parliament, according to the diſtribution made by the Board of Admiralty, which ought to be proportional to the population, number of ſhips, and ſmall craft of thoſe ſea-ports, villages, and pariſhes.

2d. That the magiſtrates of each town, and the juſtices of peace in each diſtrict, ſhall be empowered and required, to take from the work and poor-houſes, in the reſpective counties, by the previous order of the

the ſheriff, ſuch healthy ſtout boys, as ſhall be deemed fit to become ſeamen. For which purpoſe, the ſaid magiſtrates and juſtices of peace ſhall take care to bind a certain number annually, as apprentices to ſea; and the overſeers of ſuch houſes, ſhall be directed to receive into them more poor children than they uſually do, and have them taught to read, write, *&c.* until they be fit to go to ſea, when they muſt be cloathed at the expence of the poor rates. By ſuch regulations, there will be a conſtant, and more ample ſupply of ſeamen, annually growing up, for the moſt important purpoſes of commerce, and of future ſea ſervice to the nation.

3d. After the requiſite complement of ſeamen is thus obtained, let every other ſpecies of impreſs and embargo be ſuſpended, never to be again revived, unleſs on the moſt urgent neceſſities of ſervice, or when this mode of ſupply has proved deficient, which, it is hoped, will ſeldom be the caſe. Extraordinary occaſions may however occur, when it may be neceſſary to have recourſe to a method of raiſing men. But the apprehenſion of this will at leaſt ſerve to ſtimulate all mer-

cantile corporations to exert themſelves in raiſing their quota of ſeamen, to prevent the interruption of their trade by embargo and impreſs, which, beſides what has been already obſerved, is highly unfavourable to the increaſe of the king's revenue.

4th. Let it further be enacted, that every ſea-port town, and ſea coaſt pariſh, ſhall be exempted from raiſing men for the army, unleſs when their quota of ſeamen is not fully ſupplied. In this caſe, they muſt make up the deficiency with recruits for the army, if required; but at all times, they muſt be liable to the quartering of troops.

5th. Naval officers muſt be appointed at a proper ſeaſon, after the aſſeſſment is ordered, to receive from each maritime diſtrict the number of men they are reſpectively aſſeſſed at; that they may be conveyed in cutters, or other veſſels, on board the king's ſhips. Further, the ſeveral pariſhes muſt be required to allow a certain weekly ſum towards the ſupport of the wives and children of married ſeamen, until they return home.

Theſe

Theſe few regulations, if enacted by Parliament, will aſſuredly procure a more ſpeedy and ſufficient ſupply of ſeamen; ſo as to enable government to counteract, or anticipate all the hoſtile attempts of the enemy. And ſhould any of the marine diſtricts at any time be deficient in their reſpective quotas, let recourſe then be had to local embargo and impreſs, without putting a ſtop to national commerce, by general embargo.

But, as the peace eſtabliſhment of the navy, has hitherto been very defective in plan, and too limited as to the number of ſeamen; it ſeems neceſſary to look further forward than to the mere ſupply of the exigencies of the preſent war; were this to terminate, even now, others no doubt will break out in the courſe of a few years. But nothing will be more conducive to prevent war, and preſerve peace, than to adopt ſuch a peace eſtabliſhment of our marine, as will facilitate a ſpeedy and ample armament, whenever our turbulent neighbours appear to be ſecretly, or openly preparing for war.

At the commencement of the laſt peace, 60 or 70000 of our matchleſs ſeamen were diſ-

charged without any care taken for their future employment, or ſupport, as if the houſe of Bourbon had become extinct, and this nation was never again to be engaged in war.

What is the conſequence of ſuch neglect? On their diſmiſſion from the navy, the merchant ſervice cannot employ them all, nor as many as they ought, for the greater ſafety of their ſhips and cargoes; ſo that theſe valuable men, after having bravely ſerved their country in war, are reduced in peace to one of theſe alternatives, either to go into foreign ſervice, perhaps to that of the enemy they have ſo lately fought againſt, and from whence they are never allowed to return; or to ſtay at home to ſtarve, or rob on the highways, and be hanged.

In a few years after, another war breaks out; if we have ſhips, we have few ſeamen; and recourſe muſt be had again to the worſt of all meaſures, that of embargo and impreſs. Even this impolitic and oppreſſive reſource, affords not the number ſufficient for the demand; the Gazette publiſhes an order, requiring that all Britiſh ſeamen, in foreign

foreign ſervice, return home. The foreign ſtates that employ them, know too well their value, to give them up ſo eaſily. Partly by the inducement of rewards, and partly by compulſion, they are prevailed upon, to renounce the ſervice of their country for ever, and the recollection of the cruel and illiberal neglect, which firſt obliged them to abandon their native land, after having courageouſly and actively ſerved it, eradicates all remains of regret and ſcruple.

To prevent in future, a national loſs of ſuch importance, let every captain of a man of war, before his ſhip is paid off, be ordered to make out an exact return of all his men on board, diſtinguiſhing how many are able good ſeamen; how many tradeſmen; how many landſmen, who go aloft, and are willing to continue ſeamen; and how many landſmen who could *not* go aloft. Theſe returns to be immediately tranſmitted and laid before the board of Admiralty, for the following purpoſes:

1ſt. That all landſmen, who have not gone aloft, and all tradeſmen, who deſire it, ſhall be diſcharged, after receiving an exact

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ſtate of their pay, and the balance due, they ſhall alſo receive ſome few ſhillings gratuity, to bear their charges, according to the diſtance they are from home.

2d. From the remaining numbers, ſhall be drafted, of good and able ſeamen, (volunteers, if poſſible) ſo many as ſhall compleat the peace eſtabliſhment of ſailors voted by Parliament, for the ſervice of the navy, which ought not to be leſs than 24,000 men; theſe, with the landſmen diſcharged, will amount to about 50,000 men; the former are to be retained in ſervice; the latter to be diſcharged, that they may return to their ſeveral occupations, from which they were taken.

3d. Of the 90,000 men now employed on board the fleet, we ſhall, at this rate, compute, there may remain about 40,000 good ſeamen ſtill to be provided for. Let them be claſſed according to the counties of Great-Britain, and Ireland, of which they are natives; then let them be diſtributed to all the ſea-ports of their reſpective counties, according to their ſeveral claſſes, or the neareſt adjacent ports, in leſs, or greater numbers,

numbers, proportionably to the ſhipping belonging to each port.

4th. Let exact regiſters be taken of theſe ſeamen, and carefully kept in each port, appointing half-pay lieutenants, or maſters and commanders, who are old, maimed, or married, to keep theſe regiſters, and allowing them a ſmall ſalary in addition to their half-pay; they are to allow, and even to aſſiſt thoſe ſeamen in hiring themſelves in the merchant ſervice, trading to any port in Europe, America, or the Weſt-Indies, but not to the Eaſt-Indies, Coaſt of Guinea, Greenland, nor Hudſon's Bay.

5th. Theſe officers ſhall duly regiſter the names of the men thus employed, the voyages they are on, the names of the ſhips, and the maſters of them, who muſt oblige themſelves to come to the regiſter office, when they return to port, and give account of the men they hired at the office, how many of them were brought home, how many dead, or deſerted, *&c.*

6th. In order to retain theſe 40,000 men, ſo as to have the command of them for future ſervice in war, and to prevent them from being

being obliged to go into foreign ſervice, by real want, let a ſmall annual penſion be given to each of them, at the rate of 4 l. *per annum* to each married man, and 3 l. to ſingle men; this expence will become the means of adding a ſtrength and ſecurity to the nation, will prove the moſt popular and profitable meaſure that the crown or any miniſtry could poſſibly concur in promoting, and, in the end, will become a great ſaving to the nation, whether we conſider the permanency it will give to a peace, the ability it will afford us of entering into a war when neceſſary, or the great ſaving of bounty money, and immenſe expence attending preſs-gangs, &c. which to a certainty, it would coſt the nation in order to raiſe an equal number of men, when war ſhall happen to break out again.

Suppoſing 20,000 of theſe men to be married, and 20,000 ſingle men, the whole expence of their annuities will, at this rate, amount only to 140,000 l. *per annum.*

An inconſiderable national expence, when compared to the great and conſiderable advantages to be obtained, by having the command

mand of 64,000 ſeamen at the moſt moderate expence; a meaſure which will render this nation ſo reſpectable, both in peace and war, as to remove all future dread of armed neutralities, or hoſtile combinations, or of the defection and perfidy of any ancient ally whatſoever.

7th. The regiſter keepers ſhall make monthly returns to the Board of Admiralty, of all vacancies or other extraordinary accidents, that happen to ſeamen on the penſion liſt, that ſuch vacancies may be immediately ordered to be filled up. Let advertiſements be firſt publiſhed for the ſeamen who have ſerved in the navy; if none preſent themſelves within a competent time ſpecified, let the vacancies be filled up by good ſeamen from the merchant ſervice, who muſt then conſider themſelves as belonging to the King, and ſubject to all the rules and articles of war.

8th. If any regiſtered ſeamen have ſons of ten or twelve years of age, let them be bound apprentices to ſea, and let the regiſter-keepers apply to the merchants accordingly; the captains

captains of men of war, ſhould be required to take them on board as ſervants.

The act of parliament or articles of war ought to ſpecify the offences by which a ſeaman ſhould incur the puniſhment of diſmiſſion from the penſion liſt, or a forfeiture of a half year, a quarter, or a month's penſion, which ſhould be applied to the ſupport of the ſick; but forfeiture of the penſion, is only to be inflicted by the ſentence of a Court Martial, conſiſting of five regiſter or other naval officers, the Preſident being in the rank of captain; and the ſentence is to be ſubmitted to the approbation of the Admiralty Board, &c. &c.

Theſe and the like meaſures, when amended and modelled, as the wiſdom of the legiſlature may deem proper, will effectually enable Great Britain to maintain her rights and ancient dominion of the ſeas, in ſpite of every attempt to invade them.

Nothing can be more obvious to all rational men's conviction, than that thoſe regulations which are founded on ancient cuſtom only, and which took place at ſome diſtant period leſs difficult than the preſent,

are

are now unequal to ſupply the exigencies of war in this great ſtruggle, againſt the augmented forces of the united Houſe of Bourbon; and as the conteſt is of infinite importance, the great object for the exertion of Britiſh valour, is to reduce the maritime power of that ambitious Houſe within the limits of its former mediocrity; without which there is no ſafety for this nation, even in peace; ſince a peace would only prove a ceſſation from hoſtilities, to be renewed by them, with redoubled ſtrength and ardour.

The farther we proceed in this war, the more it becomes indiſpenſibly neceſſary for the Britiſh Government, to attend ſtrictly to promote the moſt effectual and beſt calculated means of enlarging and improving both our naval and military eſtabliſhments for the powerful ſupport of the ſervice, both at home and abroad. Nothing can more powerfully tend to animate and incite the ardour of all ranks of men in publick ſervice, at ſo extraordinary a criſis, than to invite them to take an active part in the national conflict, by holding out to them more liberal means

of

of ſupport, and a well aſcertained recompenſe of ſervice, in the regularity and bountifulneſs of which, we ſhould not fall ſhort of other nations, nor exact compulſive or perpetual ſervitude from men, whoſe characteriſtick genius, and natural diſpoſition, revolts at the very idea of ſuch ſervice.

May the experience which we have already acquired during the courſe of this war, teach us wiſely to ſelect and adopt ſuch plans as ſhall prove moſt conducive to the improvement of our naval, and military ſyſtems, by which we can only hope effectually to protect the rights, and intereſts, of this crown and nation, which ſeems now to ſtand on the brink of a precipice. If ſhe wanders any further from the paths, which would ſtill conduct her, not only to ſafety, but to ſplendor, her conſequence is loſt for ever.

Some perſons may perhaps think it preſumption in a military writer, to treat on a ſubject ſo foreign to his own profeſſion.

In apology, he can only ſay, he pretends not to any theoretical, or practical knowledge in the naval art. He allows himſelf only to judge

judge of the general regulations purſued, in maintaining that moſt important branch of our national ſtrength, to point out ſome glaring imperfections, and propoſe the remedy.

In ſhort, the author of theſe few pages happening not to have any active part aſſigned him in his profeſſion, as he uſed to have, in former wars; wiſhes only to render ſome of the leiſure hours of his retirement, as uſeful as poſſible, to the cauſe of his Sovereign, and Country. How far his endeavours to this purpoſe, may have proved ſucceſsful, he now ſubmits to the judgment of the candid, and impartial.

PLAN III.

OR,

SECT. VII.

For Recruiting the Eaſt-India Company's Service, without having Recourſe to the worſt of all Meaſures, that of Kidnapping.

THE European part of the Eaſt-India Company's Service, has hitherto been ſupplied with recruits, by means, confeſſedly unconſtitutional, without having any plauſible pretence to the plea of neceſſity, which is often deemed ſufficient to palliate ſlighter deviations of this ſort.

To put an intire ſtop to the odious licence, ſo long perſiſted in, of kidnapping, and otherwiſe invegling men into the Eaſt-India Company's Service, is one of thoſe voluntary conceſſions, towards gaining the good-will

of

of a brave people, which might well be made in their favour, and would prove of great advantage, at the ſame time, to the Company's military ſervice.

This practice is ſo obviouſly illegal, that it appears rather to be connived at, than authoriſed: the abolition of it therefore ought to be granted readily as a meaſure of all others the moſt equitable and popular.

What degree of fidelity, and zeal in ſervice, can reaſonably be expected from men, under ſuch oppreſſive circumſtances of compulſion, as thoſe alluded to?—Reſentments muſt operate ſtrongly on uncultivated minds, when we ſee that the refinements of education, and manners, are inſufficient to check their undue influence, on thoſe of ſuperior ſtation.

It ſeldom happens, that a ſoldier will deſert to the enemy, or join in mutiny, without having ſome grievance, often two well founded, to alledge in his defence. Therefore, to have effectual good ſervice, the ſoldier ought to be a volunteer. Impreſſed ſervice is ever ineligible, generally unneceſſary, and commonly diſappoints

its purpoſe, eſpecially in the military line. It ought therefore, to be ever rejected, except as a *derniere reſſource*, on the moſt urgent emergencies.

In order, then, to procure a regular, and more ready ſupply of well diſciplined men, more fit for ſervice, than can well be expected from kidnapped men, without diſcipline; drawn forth from unwholeſome private priſons, after long confinement; and immediately tranſported like felons, though deſigned perhaps, for the conqueſt of great, and remote kingdoms: It is propoſed, that the Eaſt-India Company be allowed, and required to raiſe a regiment here, at their own expence, on the following conditions; which will correct the errors complained of, and prevent the bad conſequences that muſt neceſſarily enſue from them.

1ſt. Let the regiment conſiſt, from 1200, to 1800 men; but to vary occaſionally in its ſtrength, betwixt theſe two numbers, according to the ſituation of the Company's affairs in India. It is to be levied, payed, cloathed, and armed, intirely at their own expence;

expence; the Directors to have the recommendation of all the officers of this corps, through the channel of the War-office, to his Majeſty.

2dly. As an incitement to ſervice, and to avoid diſputes, and other inconveniencies that may ariſe in recruiting among officers of the different ſervices, let the officers of this corps have rank in the king's ſervice, according to the dates of their reſpective commiſſions.

3dly. It is propoſed, that the regiment ſhall be always ſtationed in the iſlands of Guernſey, Jerſey, Iſle of Wight, and Scilly, &c. There to be drafted annually, by order of the Eaſt-India Directors, to what number they may judge neceſſary for the exigency of their ſervice in India; and to be embarked about the uſual ſeaſons of their ſhips ſailing for that country.

4thly. The regiment, according to its immediate ſtrength, muſt do duty in theſe iſlands, and conſider itſelf in all reſpects as garriſon troops there, and muſt accordingly obey his Majeſty's orders, ſignified by the Secretary at War. But this regiment, or any

detachment

detachment from it, is not to be permitted to land in the iſlands of Great Britain, or Ireland, except in ſmall parties, with beating orders, as is uſual for the recruiting ſervice; nor muſt this regiment be ſent on any ſervice out of the iſlands, where it is ſtationed, without the previous concurrence of the Eaſt-India Directors.

5thly. To prevent too great a waſte of Britiſh ſubjects, on the India ſervice, the propriety of inliſting 500, or 600 Germans, giving commiſſions to a proportionable number of officers, or gentlemen of that country to ſerve along with them, and to be incorporated in this regiment, is humbly ſubmitted to further conſideration; as it ſuppoſed to be a meaſure that might be adopted, with advantage to the Company's ſervice, and prove conducive to the intereſt of the nation, on the principle of preſerving its inhabitants as much as poſſible, for its own ſervice, and for its manufactures.

It may perhaps be objected to this plan, that it interferes with the recruiting ſervice of the army, as it now ſtands. But the objection is groundleſs: That there is an indiſpenſible

diſpenſible neceſſity, for the Company's Service, being recruited by either of theſe means, it is preſumed, no man will deny.

It remains then only to conſider, whether the meaſure of kidnapping, or the regular mode of raiſing men, by means of an eſtabliſhed, well diſciplined corps, is the more likely to occaſion to the nation in general, and to the army in particular, the moſt pernicious effects. But this alternative, ſeems ſo obviouſly preferable to that, as to render all further diſcuſſion unneceſſary, nor indeed, will they bear any degree of compariſon, either on civil, or military principles.

However, leſt any one ſhould incline to be ſceptical, and ſtill doubt the propriety of the meaſure propoſed, ſo far as reſpects the army, we beg leave, only to put the following queſtion, and ſtake the inference, on a fair anſwer:

Will any well informed officer, or other gentleman, pretend to maintain, that the odious practice of kidnapping, does, in no inſtance, interfere, nor injure the recruiting ſervice of the army?

It is preſumed, no one will: For it is a clear fact, that all the kidnapped men are taken from this very claſs of people, from whom, the army is ſupplied with recruits; and, it is equally clear, that nine out of ten kidnapped men, would rather ſerve voluntarily in our army, than involuntarily in the Eaſt-India Company's ſervice.

From which we may naturally infer, that almoſt every kidnapped man is a loſs to our recruiting ſervice, and conſequently this odious practice, complained of, is a very hurtful interference with it.

It therefore follows, that if the kidnapping is prohibited, it cannot poſſibly injure the king's recruiting ſervice, whilſt it will effectually promote that of the other; eſpecially, if this regulation be but eſtabliſhed, *viz.* That the Company's ſtandard ſhall be always kept, half an inch lower than that of the king's.

But, the Company's Service muſt be ſupplied at all rates; of two evils, chooſe the leaſt. — Either, continue to kidnap men, leave their number unaſcertained, keep them impriſoned, diſcontented, and undiſciplined:

undiſciplined: or, give more conſtitutional ſanction, for an aſcertained number of voluntary recruits, to be annually raiſed for this ſervice, to be regularly formed in battalions, diſciplined before ſent on ſervice, and enjoying, at leaſt, equal privileges with the army, beſides giving the ſtate the conſiderable benefit of this regiment's ſervice, as garriſon troops in thoſe iſlands, whilſt the Company are at the ſole expence of its eſtabliſhment.

In every point of view, the preference in the choice of theſe modes of recruiting the Eaſt-India Company Service, is ſo obvious to reaſon, as leaves little room for heſitation, and ſeems totally to remove the above objection, which is the only one, that can poſſibly be ſuppoſed, to be made, againſt the meaſure here ſuggeſted, &c.

FINIS.